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MATTHEw R. BYRNE*
The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 gives
the President of the United States the authority to block certain mergers or
acquisitions for national security reasons. Specifically, the Act covers
mergers and acquisitions that would allow foreign companies or persons to
acquire control of U.S. companies. The President has delegated his Exon-
Florio authority to investigate such transactions to the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), but he ultimately retains
the power to approve or block transactions.
CFIUS was recently in the public spotlight due to the Committee's
involvement in the attempts by CNOOC, an oil company owned by the
Chinese government, to acquire Unocal Corp., an American oil company,
and the attempt by Dubai Ports World, a ports management company
owned by the government of the United Arab Emirates, to acquire
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Navigation Co. In the wake of those two
transactions various members of Congress suggested changes to the Exon-
Florio statute that were meant to enhance the statute 's protection of our
country 's national security.
Exon-Florio currently maintains a careful balance between national
security and foreign investment; this balance allows for all valid national
security concerns relating to covered transactions to be addressed while
preventing the statute from turning into a protectionist tool that limits
foreign investment in the United States. Greater congressional involvement
in the CFIUS review process would politicize the process in a manner that
would change Exon-Florio from a national security tool to a protectionist
tool and would raise serious constitutional and policy concerns. Similarly,
inserting "economic security" as a criterion for CFIUS review would take
the focus off of national security and place it on economic protectionism.
Replacing the Secretary of the Treasury as the chair of the committee would
also upset this balance by sending a signal that our country's open
investment policy is in danger while adding no additional national security
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benefit, as national security interests are already adequately represented in
the CFIUS process. However, changes which would require more reporting
by CFIUS to Congress on its activities would provide certain benefits while
not upsetting the current national security/foreign investment balance
maintained by the statute.
I. INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush has committed his Administration to taking
every possible step to protect our country's national security in light of the
worldwide threat posed by Islamo-fascism, particularly in light of the
terrorist attacks against our country on September 11, 2001.1 Similarly, the
Administration has been an active proponent of free trade and an open
investment policy in the United States.2 While both laudable, these two goals
may come into conflict when foreign direct investment transactions within
the United States potentially threaten national security.
This conflict between the demands of national security and an open
foreign investment policy was illustrated in a very public way by two recent
controversies surrounding attempts by foreign corporations to acquire
American corporations: the attempt by the China National Offshore Oil
Corporation, Ltd. ("CNOOC")3 to acquire Unocal, a U.S. oil company,4 and
1 Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to
the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (including links to
audio and video of the speech); see also PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA iii (2002),
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY] ("To
defeat this threat we must make use of every tool in our arsenal-military power, better
homeland defenses, law enforcement, intelligence, and vigorous efforts to cut off terrorist
financing.").
2 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 17 ("A strong world economy
enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the
world .... We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's
shores.").
3 CNOOC, Ltd., referred to in this Note as CNOOC, is a subsidiary of the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation, which owns seventy-one percent of its stock.
Elizabeth Douglass, Unocal Says It Favored CNOOC Bid; The Oil Company Says it
Would Have Accepted the Chinese Offer Had it Been Sufficiently Sweetened, L.A. TIMES,
July 26, 2005, at C1. The parent company is entirely owned by the Chinese government.
See China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Corporate Information Page,
http://www.cnooc.com.cn/defaulten.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2006); CNOOC Limited,
Company Overview Page, http://www.cnoocltd.com/about/channel/about1281.asp (last
visited Oct. 8, 2006).
4 See Peter M. Friedman, Note, Risky Business: Can Faulty Country Risk Factors in
the Prospectuses of U.S. Listed Chinese Companies Raise Violations of U.S. Securities
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the attempt by Dubai Ports World ("DPW"), a state-owned company based in
the United Arab Emirates, to acquire a British company that would have
given DPW operating rights at terminals in a number of American ports.
5
Both of these controversies featured criticism of the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States ("CFRUS" or "the Committee"), an
interagency committee chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury. 6 CFIUS is
tasked by the President under the Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense
Production Act of 1950 with reviewing mergers and acquisitions for national
security concerns. 7
CNOOC's attempt to acquire Unocal occurred in the summer of 2005.
After a much-publicized bidding and public relations war for control of
Unocal between CNOOC and another major U.S. oil company, Chevron,
Inc., CNOOC's bid was ultimately defeated by political pressure applied by
the United States Congress. 8 Many members of Congress had publicly and
forcefully expressed grave reservations about the possible national security
Law?, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 241, 274 n.181 (2005) (citing Stephanie
Kirchgaessner, 'Congressional Angst' Scuppers Chinese Bid, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug.
3, 2005, at 22). The North Carolina Law Review very recently published a piece
examining the CNOOC/Unocal transaction from the perspective of whether it would have
been proper to block the transaction under the Exon-Florio statute. Michael Petrusic,
Recent Development, Oil and the National Security: CNOOC's Failed Bid To Purchase
Unocal, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1373 (2006).
5 David E. Sanger & Eric Lipton, Bush Would Veto Any Bill Halting Dubai Port
Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at Al; Bernard Wysocki, Jr. et al., In Ports Furor, A
Clash Over Dubai-Debate Exposes Conflicts Between Security Needs and Foreign
Investment, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at Al, available at
http://www.ofii.org/newsroom/news/022306wsj2.html.
6 Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988) [hereinafter Exon-Florio, or
Exon-Florio Amendment, or the Amendment] (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170 (2000)). The Amendment takes its name from its primary congressional sponsors.
James J. Exon was a United States Senator from Nebraska from 1979 to 1997. See
Senators of the United States: 1789-2006: A Chronological List of Senators from the
First Congress to the 109th Congress 75,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/chronlist.pdf. James Florio
was a member of the United States House of Representatives from New Jersey from 1975
to 1990, and later served as Governor of New Jersey. See Biographical Directory of the
United States Congress: Florio, James Joseph,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=F002 15 (last visited Oct. 8,
2006). The statute has been described as one of the "few restrictions" the federal
government places on foreign investment coming into the United States. Cheryl Tate,
Note, The Constitutionality of State Attempts to Regulate Foreign Investment, 99 YALE
L.J. 2023, 2026 (1990).
7 Exon-Florio Amendment, § 5021.
8 Friedman, supra note 4.
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repercussions if China's state-owned company gained control of Unocal's oil
reserves. 9 This debate led to discussion of not only national security, but also
economic security. 10 Even though CFIUS never initiated a review of the
CNOOC transaction, let alone gave the transaction its approval, numerous
members of Congress who feared that the Committee would not block the
transaction began to suggest that changes to the Exon-Florio statute were in
order as a means to address these concerns. I
This debate over changes to Exon-Florio resumed in early 2006, when
DPW attempted to purchase Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co.
("P&O"), a British firm, in a $6.8 billion deal. 12 With the acquisition of
P&O, the Dubai-based company would have acquired operational control of
certain terminals at six U.S. ports. 13 The revelation that CFJUS had approved
the deal set off a firestorm of criticism on Capitol Hill as members and
leaders of both political parties in Congress denounced the merger. 14 Though
DPW and the Bush Administration agreed to conduct an additional forty-
five-day investigation under the CFIUS statute, the House Appropriations
Committee voted 62-2 to effectively block the transaction, and under intense
political pressure DPW agreed to transfer its U.S. ports interests to an
9 For example, Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana warned that CNOOC's acquisition of
Unocal could have "serious consequences for our national security and energy needs."
Press Release, Senator Evan Bayh, Bayh Urges Review of Chinese Bid for Unocal:
Senator Asks for Report from Energy, Homeland Security and Defense Secretaries
Before Review of Offer (July 22, 2005), available at
http://bayh.senate.gov/-bayh/releases/2005/07/22JULY05PR2.htm. Other members of
Congress wrote letters to the President to express their displeasure as well. See, e.g.,
Press Release, Senator Chuck Grassley & Senator Max Baucus, Grassley Expresses
Concern Over Potential CNOOC-Unocal Deal (July 13, 2005), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease-id
=4939 [hereinafter Grassley, CNOOC-Unocal Deal].
10 See, e.g., Edward Alden & Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Political Payments Raise
Questions: Stephanie Kirchgaessner and Edward Alden Look into Suggestions Chevron
is Urging Political Allies to Oppose CNOOC, FIN. TIMES (London), June 30, 2005, at 30.
Some members of Congress proposed that economic security should become a normal
element of review by CFIUS. See infra Part IV.B.
11 Christopher Corr, Pressures to Stiffen Exon-Florio: The Chinese Bid for Unocal
Sparks a Firefight over Inbound Deals, MERGERS AND ACQUIsrrIONs, DEALMAKER'S J.,
Jan. 1, 2006, at 36.
12 Sanger & Lipton, supra note 5.
13 Id; United States Department of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Securing U.S.
Ports, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=5437 [hereinafter
Department of Homeland Security Fact Sheet].
14 See infra note 205.
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American buyer. 15 In the midst of the ports controversy, legislation was
proposed in Congress not only to block the deal, but also to make substantial
changes to the Exon-Florio statute in an attempt to strengthen the CFIUS
review process.16 As of the time this Note goes to publication, committees in
both the House and Senate have approved legislation that would modify the
Exon-Florio statute. 17 The full bodies have not yet approved these bills, their
significant differences have not been reconciled in a conference committee,
and the President has not signed a bill. Therefore, these bills' proposed
changes to the statute are still mere possibilities, not certainties.
These controversies and the loud calls to amend Exon-Florio that
accompanied both of them illustrate that changes to the Exon-Florio statute
are likely. These changes could potentially have a tremendous impact on the
country's national security and economic health.18 This Note argues that the
Exon-Florio statute and CFIUS process currently maintain an appropriate
balance between national security and economic security. It then examines
recent congressional proposals to amend the Exon-Florio statute, and argues
that such changes would have dire consequences for this balance.
Part II of this Note provides a detailed description of the Exon-Florio
process as well as of the legislative history behind Exon-Florio and the
executive orders that delegated the President's authority under the statute to
CFIUS. It is important to understand this legislative history in order to
comprehend the context in which changes to the Exon-Florio statute occur.
Part III explains four major transactions that were examined by CFIUS (or in
the case of CNOOC, merely mentioned in the context of a potential review
15 David E. Sanger, Under Pressure, Dubai Company Drops Port Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 10, 2006, at Al.
16 See infra text accompanying notes 196-211.
17 The Senate Banking Committee approved a bill sponsored by Senator Richard
Shelby (R-AL) by a 20-0 vote on March 31, 2006. Amy Fagan, Port Security Measures
Advance in Congress; CFIUS Revamping, More Funds Proposed, WASH. TIMES, Mar.
31, 2006, at A04. The House Financial Services Committee approved a bill sponsored
primarily by Representative Roy Blunt (R-MO) which seeks fewer and less drastic
changes to Exon-Florio than the Senate version. Ron Orol, House Panel Approves CFIUS
Measure, DAILY DEAL, June 15, 2006. See infra text accompanying notes 205-07 for
additional details.
18 The importance of national security goes without saying; it must be the primary
responsibility of the President and concern of the Congress at all times, but especially so
in times of war, such as today, when the country is threatened by al-Qaeda and other
radical Islamic terrorist groups, Iran, and North Korea. What may be less well known is
the significant contribution that investment from abroad into the United States makes to
our nation's economic health. For example, in 2005 new foreign direct investment in the
United States alone totaled $79.8 billion; the payroll of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
companies was $317.9 billion. Organization for International Investment, Top 10 List
Facts About Insourcing, Mar. 2006, http://www.ofii.org/topl0FACTS.pdf.
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that never actually occurred) and that received far greater public attention
than average CFLUS transactions. Part IV explains the various changes to the
Exon-Florio statute that have been proposed in Congress as a result of the
fear by some members of Congress that the current system is insufficient to
protect the country's national security. Finally, Part V explains why the
current statutory system maintains a careful balance between national
security and the promotion of an open investment policy, and how the
proposed changes to the Exon-Florio statute could potentially impact that
balance. The conclusion then summarizes those changes that would be
beneficial and those that would be detrimental to the Exon-Florio balance.
II. THE ExON-FLORIO STATUTE AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Understanding the recent controversies involving CFIUS and the
subsequent proposals to change the Exon-Florio statute requires an
appreciation for how the Exon-Florio process is currently structured and of
the legislative history behind that structure. Exon-Florio has a highly relevant
legislative history, and the development of the statute and the executive
orders that implement it has been heavily influenced by outside events. As
will be demonstrated, the legislative history of Exon-Florio and the manner
in which it has been implemented reveal that a careful balance is maintained
between national security and an open investment policy. 19
A. The Exon-Florio Process Today
Exon-Florio gives the President or his designee--CFIUS-the authority
to conduct an investigation regarding the possible impact on national security
of mergers and acquisitions involving "foreign persons which could result in
foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the United
States." 20 The question of which transactions are covered by Exon-Florio is a
complicated one, and has been addressed by Treasury in detail in the Code of
Federal Regulations.21 These transactions, or CFIUS transactions, are almost
always brought to the attention of CFIUS when one or both parties to a
19 See infra text accompanying notes 218-43.
20 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000). "Foreign persons" includes companies, not
merely individuals, and is defined at 31 C.F.R. § 800.213 (2005). "Control" is defined at
31 C.F.R. § 800.204.
21 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.301, 800.302. The question of what qualifies as a CFIUS
transaction can be difficult, and of course is of concern to businesses hoping to complete
a merger or acquisition. However, it is a legal question that is not directly relevant to the
topic of this Note, and therefore will be left to others to explain.
[Vol. 67:849
MAINTAINING THE EXON-FLORIO BALANCE
transaction file a voluntary notice with the Committee. 22 Treasury, as the
chair of CFIUS, may reject these notices as incomplete and request that
additional information be provided to the Committee before the
commencement of a review.23 Alternatively, a member of the CFIUS
Committee may ask the Committee to consider a transaction which has not
been voluntarily reported to the Committee by the parties; in such an event
the parties are notified of the review and asked to submit information.24
CFRUS does not consider a notice complete unless an actual transaction
exists. 25
Once notice is complete, CFIUS has thirty days to conduct a "review" of
the transaction for national security concerns. 26 CFIUS may consider a
number of factors described in the statute to determine if the transaction may
negatively impact national security. 27 If during this thirty day review the
Committee finds that further review is necessary, then the Committee may
initiate a forty-five-day investigation.28 Such an investigation is mandatory in
the event that the acquiring firm is "controlled by or acting on behalf of a
foreign government" when the transaction "could result in control" of a U.S.
company that "could affect ... national security."'29 If an investigation is
initiated, then a report must be made to the President regarding the views of
the Committee, including dissenting views, on the matter of whether "there is
credible evidence ... to believe that the foreign interest exercising control
22 31 C.F.R. § 800.401. Notices submitted by one party acting alone-usually a
hostile bidder-are referred to as unilateral notices.
23 31 C.F.R. § 800.403.
24 31 C.F.R. § 800.401(b). Once three years have passed since the completion of a
transaction, only the Chair of CFHUS may request a review. § 800.401(c). Therefore,
there is technically no outer time limit to the possibility of a review after the completion
of a transaction.
25 CFIUS, as a matter of policy, does not issue advisory opinions. Thus, only
completed transactions are eligible for review. Ron Orol, CNOOC Pushes Pawn in
Unocal Chess Match, DAILY DEAL/THE DEAL, July 5, 2005, at 5 ("Such a [CF1US]
review, however, is contingent on companies striking a deal."); Robert Collier, Backlash
to Chinese Bid for Unocal; Bush Urged to Block Takeover Because of Energy, Security
Fears, S. F. CHRON., June 24, 2005, at Al (Secretary of the Treasury John Snow states
that a CF1US review was "hypothetical at this point because we don't have a
transaction"); Todd Bullock & Katie Xiao, Bush Administration Says Review of Chinese
Unocal Bid Premature; Unocal Shareholders to Vote on Offer from Chinese Oil
Producer August 10, FED. INFO. & NEWS DISPATCH, July 19, 2005 (stating that CF1US
does not begin reviews of potential mergers and acquisitions until a bid is accepted).
26 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000); 31 C.F.R. § 800.
27 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(t).
28 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
29 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b). This provision was part of the Byrd Amendment to
Exon-Florio. See infra text accompanying notes 117-120.
2006]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
might take action that threatens to impair the national security" and whether
any other provisions of law may provide relief,30 other than the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act.31 However, CFIUS may also permit a
company to withdraw its filing, either during the thirty-day review or forty-
five-day investigation phases, and re-file at a later date.32 Once the
Committee's report has been sent to the President, he has fifteen days to
make his findings--on the same issues as were referred to him after the
investigation-to take no action, to decide to block the transaction, (or to
order divestiture if the transaction is already completed.)33 Other important
provisions of Exon-Florio, its implementing executive order, and the
accompanying regulations are discussed when relevant in this Note.
B. CFIUS Before Exon-Florio
In 1975, President Gerald Ford signed Executive Order 11,858, which
created the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States.34 At the
time, the Committee consisted of six members 35 and was responsible for
"monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United States... and for
coordinating the implementation of United States policy on such
30 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e).
31 Id. This Act allows the President to declare a national emergency in regard to a
foreign state or other foreign entity, and is usually reserved for extreme situations. 50
U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000).
32 31 C.F.R. § 800.505 (2005). This provision has recently been the subject of
criticism. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL
REQUESTERS: DEFENSE TRADE: ENHANCEMENTS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXON-
FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW'S EFFECTIVENESS 1 (2005).
33 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)-(e); 31 C.F.R. § 800.601.
34 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. app. 159 (1976); Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3
C.F.R. (1971-1975), as amended.
35 Two members were added to the pre-Exon-Florio CFIUS in 1980 by President
Jimmy Carter, bringing the total membership to eight. Exec. Order No. 12,188, 3 C.F.R.
131 (1981). This number had not changed by the time Exon-Florio was passed in 1988.
However, since that time additional members have been added. See Exec. Order No.
12,661, § 3-201(2)(F), 3 C.F.R. 618 (1989); Exec. Order No. 12,860, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 629
(1994); Exec. Order No. 13,286, § 57(a), 3 C.F.R. 166 (2003). Therefore, today the full
membership of CFIUS includes: the Secretary of the Treasury (Chair), the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, the Secretary of Commerce, the United States Trade Representative, the
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of the Council of
Economic Advisers, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director
of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the Assistant to the President for
Economic Policy. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. app. 159 (1976), as amended.
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investment."'36 Additionally, the Secretary of Commerce was charged with
collecting and monitoring data on foreign investment in the United States
that would be used by the Committee. 37 These provisions still exist today,
even after numerous amendments to the original Executive Order.
Under Executive Order 11,858, CFIUS and the President did not have
the authority to block transactions involving the takeover of U.S. companies
by foreign persons or entities, but rather merely the authority to review such
transactions in general.38 However, when the Senate later held hearings on
the possible passage of the Exon-Florio Amendment, several witnesses stated
that the ability of this early CFIUS to review foreign mergers and
acquisitions alerted the government to potential problems with individual
transactions.39 These problems were always resolved through the use of other
statutory mechanisms, such as antitrust laws or the Department of Defense's
ability to require business restructuring when classified contracts were
involved.40
C. Passage of Exon-Florio
More than a decade after Executive Order 11,858 was issued, Congress
passed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.41 The House
Committee Report for an early version of this Act described the Act as
"represent[ing] the most comprehensive restructuring of basic U.S. trade
policy since the Trade Act of 1974," and as "a response to the serious decline
in United States competitiveness and the rapid growth in our trade deficit. 42
The Act included the Exon-Florio Amendment to § 721 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950.43 Exon-Florio granted the President or his designee
the power to review acquisitions of U.S. companies by foreign persons for
36 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 3 C.F.R. app. 159 § 1(b) (1976).
3 7 Id. §2.
38 Seeid. § 1.
39 See, e.g., Foreign Takeovers and National Security: Hearing on Section 905 of
HR. 3 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness
of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 17-18 (1987) [hereinafter
Foreign Takeovers Hearings] (statement of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Under Secretary
for International Trade, Department of Commerce).
40 Id.
41 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021,
102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988).
42 H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 1, at 2-3 (1987).
43 Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000)).
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national security concerns and, if necessary, to block those transactions or to
order divestment if a transaction had already been completed.44
1. Overview of Exon-Florio
The early bills that would eventually lead to the passage of Exon-Florio
contained language that was far broader than that found in the final version
of the Act. One early version of the Amendment, § 907 of House Bill 3,45
gave the Secretary of Commerce the authority to review mergers,
acquisitions, and takeovers, as well as joint ventures and licensing, to
determine their effect on "national security, essential commerce, and
economic welfare." 46 The Secretary was permitted to seek input from the
44 "The President or the President's designee may make an investigation to
determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers ... by
or with foreign persons which could result in foreign control of persons engaged in
interstate commerce in the United States." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (2000). After an
investigation is complete, the President "may take such action for such time as the
President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit any acquisition, merger, or
takeover, of a person engaged in interstate commerce in the United States... by or with
foreign persons so that such control will not threaten to impair the national security." 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170(d).
Congress wrote into the statute a provision which prohibits courts from reviewing
decisions by the President to block a transaction or to order divestiture of a company
under Exon-Florio. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e). This statutory bar on judicial review of
CF1US decisions explains why this Note contains no discussion of any case law directly
addressing CFIUS issues, but rather only cases discussing constitutional issues which
concern proposed changes to the statute. Those cases which do mention CFIUS or Exon-
Florio tend to mention it in a passing manner while discussing other matters adjudicated
in a merger or acquisition context. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 155 B.R. 636 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1993); In re Chateaugay Corp., 186 B.R. 561 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); LTV
Aerospace & Def. Co. v. Thomson-CSF, S.A., 198 B.R. 848 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996);
Consol. Gold Fields, PLC v. Anglo Am. Corp. of S. Afr., 713 F. Supp. 1457 (S.D.N.Y.
1989); In re Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003); and In re
Global Crossing Ltd., 295 B.R. 720 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). This bar on judicial review
is certainly an uncommon provision in federal law. In the antitrust context, the DOJ and
FTC use the Second Request process as a means of effectively cutting out the judiciary
from the review process, yet there is no actual statutory bar to such review. See Matthew
S. Bailey, Note, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: Needing a Second Opinion About Second
Requests, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 440 (2006).
45 Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 3, 100th
Cong. § 907 (1987). This Act went through multiple revisions while being considered by
Congress, like any bill. Therefore the numbering of individual sections may vary
depending on the version of the bill being examined. For consistency purposes, this Note
will refer to the version of the bill which numbered the Exon-Florio and Bryant
Amendments (discussed below) as sections 907 and 704, respectively.
46 Id. § 907(a).
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Secretary of Defense and other principals, as well as to hold hearings.47 After
a forty-five-day investigation, the Commerce Secretary was to make his
recommendation to the President, who could then block the transaction or
take other appropriate action.48 This early version of Exon-Florio expressly
stated that the Secretary should consider factors relating not simply to
national security, but also to "essential commerce." 49
This early version of the trade bill also included section 704,50 a
provision referred to as the "Bryant Amendment," named after its sponsor.51
This Amendment required all foreign entities or companies that acquired a
"significant interest" or a "controlling interest" in a U.S. property or business
to provide very detailed information to the Secretary of Commerce regarding
the acquisition, the size of the interest acquired, the salaries of the foreign
company's top managers, and more, within thirty days of the acquisition.52
The House Committee Report regarding House Bill 3 said that
sections 704 and 907 were "designed to better enable our government to
recognize and respond to threats to our economic security. '53 The sponsors
of section 704 argued that in light of the country's large trade deficit, "there
is only a limited picture of where this foreign capital is coming from and
where it is going." 54 The House Committee agreed that foreign investment is
generally a good thing for the country, but argued that the large influence of
foreign investors raised "long-range concerns regarding economic and
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. The full text on this matter stated:
[T]he Secretary [of Commerce] and the President shall further recognize the close
relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national security and essential
commerce, and shall take into consideration the impact of foreign control on the
economic welfare of individual domestic industries, and any substantial
unemployment, decrease in revenues of government, loss of skills or investment, or
other serious effects resulting from the control of such industries by foreign citizens
shall be considered, without excluding other factors, in determining whether such
weakening of our internal economy may impair the national security and essential
commerce.
Id.
5 0 Id. § 704.
51 See Mergers and Acquisitions-Foreign Investments in the United States:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization of the H. Comm. on Banking, Fin.
and Urb. Aff., 100th Cong. 4-6 (1987) [hereinafter Mergers and Acquisitions Hearings]
(statement of Representative John Bryant (D-TX) describing his Amendment).
52 Trade and International Economic Policy Reform Act, H.R. 3, 100th Cong. § 704
(1987).
53 H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at 47 (1987).
54 Id.
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political independence and, ultimately, national security. 55 The House
Committee argued that the Bryant Amendment was necessary to gain suh
information because current sources were either incomplete or unavailable
outside of the agencies doing the collection. 56
In justifying section 907 (which included not just national security, but
"essential commerce" as a factor the President could protect), the House
Committee used very similar arguments to those used to support
section 704.57 The Committee pointed to the proposed takeover of Fairchild
Semiconductor by Fujitsu Corporation of Japan as an example of a takeover
that, if it had actually occurred, would have hurt national security and
essential commerce. 58 The Committee also argued that semiconductors were
essential to the nation's defense, and that their loss to a foreign country
"would be tantamount to [the] loss of the ability to produce airplanes during
World War 11." 59
In the dissenting views to the Conference Report, the Republican
committee members said that the Bryant Amendment imposed "burdensome
and unjustifiable reporting requirements for foreign investors," which, if
enacted, would "have an immediate, and possibly disastrous effect, on the
current and future levels of foreign investment in the United States." 60 They
proceeded to say that if section 704 was left in the bill, they would urge
Republicans in the House to vote against it and President Reagan to veto it.61
They also argued that the provision was unnecessary because the information
that Congress really needed to make decisions in this area was readily
available; the high level of detail asked of foreign investors would only
succeed in scaring those investors away from the country. 62
In the Senate, an early version of Exon-Florio similar to the House's
section 907 was section 1401 of Senate Bill 1420.63 The Senate version, like
the House version, included "essential commerce" along with national
security as a basis for review. 64 However, it established different procedures
for the review: the Secretary of Commerce had responsibility for the process
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 48-49.
58 Id. at 48.
59 H.R. REP. No. 100-40, pt. 2, at48 (1987).
60 Id. at 109.
61 Id. at 110.
62 Id.. at 112.
63 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1420, 100th Cong. § 1401
(1987). The Senate did not include a provision similar to the Bryant Amendment in its
early version of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.
64 Id.
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but could only initiate the review on the recommendation of a small number
of executive branch officials, public hearings were discouraged, etc.65 This
provision introduced various criteria the President was to evaluate in making
his decision after receiving the Secretary's report; such criteria were not
included in the original House version.66 The Senate version also excluded
licenses and joint ventures from review.67 Finally, unlike the House version,
the Senate version added Exon-Florio as a new section to the Defense
Production Act of 1950,68 rather than introducing it as a free-standing
provision. 69 The placement of Exon-Florio in the Defense Production Act, as
opposed to a code section on trade, signified the decision of the provision's
drafters and of Congress in general to ultimately limit Exon-Florio to the
national security context.70
2. Objections to the Original Exon-Florio
Objections to these original versions of Exon-Florio were raised by the
Reagan Administration and various industry groups. 71 The Reagan
Administration initially argued that CFrUS, which at that time did not have
enforcement powers, was a sufficient mechanism for dealing with threats to
national security arising from corporate mergers because it could alert other
sections of the government to potential problems.72 The government could
then use existing laws to deal with the problem.73 In his written testimony,
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2170, 64 Stat. 7989
(1950).
69 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1987, S. 1420, 100th Cong. § 1401
(1987).
70 See infra text accompanying notes 83-84.
71 See, e.g., Foreign Takeovers Hearings, supra note 39, at 20-24 (written testimony
of David C. Mulford, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs);
Mergers and Acquisitions Hearings, supra note 51, at 60-69 (written testimony of Robert
L. McNeill, Executive Vice Chairman of the Emergency Committee for American Trade)
(explaining that his organization, along with the National Association of Manufacturers,
the National Foreign Trade Council, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the U.S.
Council for International Business, were concerned about the Exon-Florio legislation).
72 Foreign Takeovers Hearings, supra note 39, at 20-21. (written testimony of
David C. Mulford, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs) ("I
believe the process and existing laws are powerful, effective, and sufficient to protect our
national interests.").
73 See id. at 20-21; see also Foreign Takeovers Hearings, supra note 39, at 17
(statement of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade,
Department of Commerce).
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Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs David Mulford
listed a number of cases where CFIUS review had been successful-without
the formal enforcement power proposed in the Exon-Florio Amendment. 74
Thus, the Reagan Administration felt that giving the authority to review these
transactions (with enforcement authority) to the Secretary of Commerce was
duplicative of CFIUS's then-current functions.75 The Administration also
spoke out against the concept of an economic security review on the grounds
that it was overly broad. 76 The Administration strongly supported an open
policy regarding foreign direct investment, and thought that the economic
security element of Exon-Florio would not only hurt the U.S. economy by
discouraging foreign direct investment in the country, but could lead other
countries to close their doors to foreign direct investment ("FDI") from the
United States. 77
Industry groups, including the Business Roundtable, the Chamber of
Commerce, and BP Oil, made essentially the same arguments in
congressional hearings. A representative of these groups, Robert McNeill of
the Emergency Committee for American Trade, said at the hearings that the
national security goal of section 907 was "generally acceptable," but that the
groups viewed the "essential commerce" and "economic welfare" goals with
"great concern." 78 They argued that the original version of section 907 would
cast a net that was too broad, by including economic security, licensing, and
joint ventures.79 He stated that business and industry groups favored the
Senate version (Title XIV) to the House version (section 907) because it
focused exclusively on national security, eliminated joint ventures and
licensing from review, provided greater confidentiality to business
information, and provided more leeway for the Secretary of Commerce to
74 Foreign Takeovers Hearings, supra note 39, at 22-23 (written testimony of David
C. Mulford, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs).
75 Foreign Takeovers Hearings, supra note 39, at 18 (statement of J. Michael
Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce). Mr.
Farren also stated that the Administration felt it was unnecessary to involve the President
in the process and that the proposed timetables for investigations were too short. Id.
76 Foreign Takeovers Hearings, supra note 39, at 21-22 (statement of David C.
Mulford, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Department of the Treasury) ("The
alternative criteria of essential commerce, and economic welfare are so broad that
virtually any contemplated investment could come under government scrutiny. This
could open practically any foreign investment to investigation and political pressure.").
77 Id. at 22-24.
78 Mergers and Acquisitions Hearings, supra note 51, at 21 (statement of Robert L.
McNeill, Executive Vice Chairman, Emergency Committee for American Trade) ("These
are enormously broad and vague standards that are of great concern to us in business.").
79 Id.
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decide whether to undertake a review. 80 A representative of Newmont
Mining, a gold mining company that was under much scrutiny in Exon-
Florio and Bryant Amendment hearings, testified that "the phrase 'essential
commerce' in Section 905 is inherently vague and imprecise," could cover
any transaction at all, and should be removed from the bill.81 These industry
representatives spoke out perhaps even more forcefully against the Bryant
Amendment. 82
Later, in response to a question from Senator Harkin, Senator Exon
stated that his Amendment was "aimed specifically at national defense
only."83 He went on to indicate that in order to get the support of the Reagan
Administration, particularly the Treasury Department, he was willing to
change the text of the Amendment to allow the President to choose which
agency would implement Exon-Florio, rather than vesting it by statute in the
80 Id. at 22-23. McNeill also pointed out that by placing Exon-Florio within the
Defense Production Act, Congress would emphasize that the review power was focused
on national security, rather than economic security. Id. at 23.
81 Mergers and Acquisitions Hearings, supra note 51, at 57 (written statement of
Richard B. Leather, Executive Vice President, Newmont Mining Corporation).
82 E.g., Mergers and Acquisitions Hearings, supra note 51, at 67-68 (written
statement of Robert L. McNeill, Executive Vice Chairman, Emergency Committee for
American Trade). These groups said that the Amendment was sure to put a chill on
foreign investment in the United States. Id. They also pointed to the fact that similar
information was already collected by the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and
Treasury, as well as the SEC, and argued that this information should be sufficient for the
government's purposes. Id. at 67.
Rep. Byrant, the sponsor of § 704, argued in related hearings that "[e]xcessive
foreign ownership in our energy and defense related industries could endanger our
national security." Federal Collection of Information on Foreign Investment in the U.S.:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 100th Cong. 10 (1988)
[hereinafter Federal Collection Hearings] (statement of Hon. John W. Bryant, U.S.
Representative from Texas). He went on to discuss proposed acquisitions of U.S. oil
companies by foreign companies in 1988. Id. at 14. These proposed acquisitions were
presented in a negative light, immediately after Byrant had discussed both national and
economic security. Id. However, he then said, "I don't raise [those acquisitions] alone as
an argument for this provision. I simply point to [them] as a reason why common sense
would tell us that we need accurate data." Id. Remember, this was in a discussion of
section 704, not section 907.
Later, in an exchange between Bryant and Senator John Danforth (R-MO), Bryant
indicated that his reporting requirements would allow policymakers to make
determinations such as whether or not a foreign investor could purchase a U.S. oil
company, because they would know "what percentage of the overall energy productive
capacity of this country they represent." Id. at 20. He indicated that he would be
concerned if 100% of the oil industry were controlled by foreign investors. Id. at 20-21.
83 Federal Collection Hearings, supra note 82, at 25 (statement of Sen. James J.
Exon).
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Secretary of Commerce.8 4 He also indicated that the Exon-Florio
Amendment would be focused on "national defense and national defense
only," whereas section 704 was more "far-reaching," and he attempted to
distance his proposal from that measure.8 5
3. Conference Committee Revision and Final Version of the
Amendment
The Conference Committee limited the review of mergers and
acquisitions to those that involved national security concerns; economic
security was removed from its version of Exon-Florio.8 6 It should be noted,
however, that "national security" was never defined by the statute. This
conference version of the Exon-Florio Amendment was identical to the one
that was ultimately passed, and was renumbered as section 5021 of the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.87 Like the original Senate version,
the Conference Committee added Exon-Florio to the Defense Production Act
of 1950 as a new section. 88 The Conference Committee also completely
removed the Bryant Amendment from the trade bill.89
President Reagan vetoed H.R. 3 on other grounds. 90 However, the bill
was not dead; after changes to other portions of the bill, Congress again sent
the measure to the President, who signed the bill into law as the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988.91 After enactment, the Exon-Florio
Amendment was codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170.92
84 Id. at 25.
85 Id. at 25-26.
86 E.g., H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 925 (1988).
87 Id. at 337-39.
88 Id. at 337.
89 E.g., id. at 927-28. Apparently Republican threats to vote against the bill and to
urge the President's veto were effective in that the Democratic sponsors agreed to remove
the Bryant Amendment and made the other changes to Exon-Florio described above.
90 President's Message to Congress Transmitting His Veto of H.R. 3, A Bill to
Enhance the Competitiveness of American Industry, and for Other Purposes, H.R. Doc.
No. 100-200, at 1-2 (1988). President Reagan objected most of all to a provision in the
trade bill that would have required companies conducting layoffs of employees to notify
those employees a certain amount of time in advance. Id.
91 Exon-Florio Amendment to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5021, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425 (1988) (codified as amended at 50
U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000)).
92 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (2000).
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D. Amendments to the Executive Order
After Exon-Florio became law, the President issued a temporary
memorandum delegating his powers under the statute to the Secretary of the
Treasury.93 This temporary arrangement, however, was soon superseded with
the issuance of Executive Order 12,661, which amended President Ford's
original executive order authorizing CFIUS. 94 In this executive order the
President permanently delegated his authority to examine transactions for
national security concerns under Exon-Florio to CFIUS.95 The majority of
Executive Order 11,858 was left intact-the review and analysis functions of
CFIUS-with the major change simply being the addition of the President's
statutory authority to block a transaction directly or order divestment based
on CFIUS's recommendation. 96 The executive order also established the
procedures that are still in place today for the review of a CFIUS
transaction. 97 Finally, Executive Order 12,661 added two members to
CFIUS, and stated that the secretaries listed in the statute, not their designees,
would be the members of the Committee.
98
E. Amendments to Exon-Florio
Congress has made or considered making statutory changes to
section 2170 on a number of occasions; some of these changes have been
more significant than others and are more relevant to the topic of this Note. 99
In 1991, Congress attempted to amend Exon-Florio in a variety of ways with
House Bill 2624.100 These changes included taking much of the authority to
93 Presidential Memorandum, included with 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170.
94 Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1989).
95 Id. This delegation of presidential authority is specifically authorized by the
Exon-Florio statute. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a).
96 Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618 (1988).
97 Id.
98 Id. § 3-201(l)(A), (F).
99 One "minor" yet important change occurred with the passage of Pub. L. No. 102-
99, which reinstated the Defense Production Act of 1950 after it lapsed on October 20,
1990. See Defense Production Act Extension and Amendments of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
99, § 8, 105 Stat. 487, 490 (1991). This Act also gave the Exon-Florio section of the
Defense Production Act permanent status; unlike the rest of the Defense Production Act,
Exon-Florio does not need to be re-authorized on a regular basis. See id.
100 Foreign Direct Investment, the Exon-Florio Foreign Acquisition Review
Process, and H.R. 2624, the Technology Preservation Act of 1991, to Amend the 1988
Exon-Florio Provision: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Stabilization of the H.
Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urb. Aff., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Foreign
Direct Investment Hearings].
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block transactions away from the President and giving it to the Secretary of
Commerce,' 0' as well as providing for "[m]andatory notice for transactions
involving export licenses and classified information, authority for assurances
and review of those assurances, expansion of the scope of transactions to
include other business accommodations ... and limiting the President's
flexibility and execution of the law." 102 The Administration of President
George H. W. Bush argued strongly against these changes, and the President
even threatened a veto of this bill on the grounds that the CFIUS process
worked effectively as it was then constructed, that the changes were
confusing, and that the changes would harm foreign direct investment in the
U.S. 10 3 The full text of H.R. 2624, which was not adopted by Congress and
did not become law, can be found in the transcript of the hearings on the
bill.104
Soon after the 1992 hearings described above, Congress was intensely
interested in the CFIUS review of the proposed acquisition of LTV Steel's
Missile Division by Thomson-CSF, a corporation owned by the French
government. 10 5 Congress held several hearings that touched on concerns
regarding the Thomson/LTV deal.10 6 In one hearing, Senator Exon
emphasized that since the passage of Exon-Florio, there had been 700
preliminary investigations conducted by CFIUS, of which only thirteen
moved to the investigation phase, and only one of which the President took
action against a transaction. 107 Exon then stated that the President had used
101 E.g., id. at 15 (statement of Rep. James Nussle).
102 Id. at 3 (statement of William E. Barreda, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Trade
and Investment Policy, U.S. Department of the Treasury).
103 Id. at 4.
104 Id. At hearings on this bill, Dr. Susan Tolchin criticized how the Exon-Florio
process was then operating and suggested changes, including the addition of economic
competitiveness and the transformation of CF1US into a regulatory commission. Foreign
Acquisitions of US. Owned Companies: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and
Monetary Pol 'y of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 102d Cong.
22-23 (1992) [hereinafter Foreign Acquisitions Hearings] (statement of Susan J. Tolchin,
Professor of Public Administration, George Washington University). Neither of these
ideas gained any traction in Congress.
105 See infra text accompanying notes 144-57.
106 See, e.g., Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal
Year 1993 and the Future Years Defense Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Def Industry and Tech. of the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 102d Cong. 228 (1992)
[hereinafter Department of Defense Hearings]; Sale of LTV Missile and Aircraft
Divisions, Hearings Before the Investigations Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Armed
Services, 102d Cong, 2d Sess. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Sale ofLTV Hearings].
10 7 E.g., Pending Transactions Under the Exon-Florio Amendment: Hearing Before
the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong. 1 (1992)
[hereinafter Pending Transactions Hearings] (statement of James J. Exon, U.S. Senator
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his Exon-Florio authority less aggressively than Exon would have preferred,
but still within the bounds of what he expected when drafting the statute.
10 8
Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) also spoke out against the Thomson/LTV
transaction. He argued that sales of U.S. weapons manufacturers to state-
owned foreign buyers should be banned. 10 9 He also emphasized that state-
owned companies are not bound by the same free market forces as private
companies.1 10 This distrust of state-owned companies gave fuel to the Byrd
Amendment, which is discussed below.
Finally, it should also be noted that during his testimony before a
congressional committee in March of 1992, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury William Barreda explained that both Congress in passing the
Exon-Florio statute and Treasury in its CFIUS regulations chose to leave
national security undefined."I ' He stated "we have not defined national
security. I think the intent of Congress was very clear, that national security
should be looked at in a broad sense" and that defining national security
would have provided foreign entities and sophisticated lawyers a chance to
structure transactions so as to get around the definition. 112 Similar sentiments
were expressed by the Acting General Counsel of the Department of
Defense, Chester Paul Beach, Jr., at a hearing on June 4, 1992,11 3and can be
found elsewhere in the CFIUS legislative history and in numerous analyses
of Exon-Florio.
Concern over the national security implications of takeovers such as the
Thomson/LTV case led to further legislative efforts to amend Exon-Florio.
One House bill would have required the President to prohibit all CFIUS
transactions unless the Secretary of Defense approved the sale. 114 A Senate
bill would have prohibited acquisitions of U.S. defense contractors by
foreign government-owned corporations.11 5 After going through the
Conference Committee, these provisions were dropped."1
6
from Nebraska). The one case in which the President took action referenced by Exon was
the CATIC/MAMCO transaction. See infra text accompanying notes 140-43.
108 Pending Transaction Hearings, at 2.
109 Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Lloyd Bentsen).
110 Id.
I I I Foreign Direct Investment Hearings, supra note 100, at 12.
112 Id.
113 Foreign Acquisitions Hearings, supra note 104, at 54 (statement of Chester Paul
Beach, Jr., Acting General Counsel of the Department of Defense).
14 H.R. REP. No. 102-966, at 730 (1992) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1769, 1821.
115 Id.
116 Id.
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Eventually, these negotiations led to the passage of the "Byrd
Amendment" to Exon-Florio, contained within the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.117 Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV), on
introducing his amendment, stated that he was dissatisfied with the Reagan
and Bush Administrations' enforcement of Exon-Florio, and offered his
amendment as a way of tightening the CFIUS review process. 118 He
expressly tied his consternation with how Exon-Florio was being enforced
with respect to the ThomsoniLTV case, arguing that his amendments would
improve that enforcement and allow Congress to gain additional information
on the workings of the CFIUS process. 119 The Byrd Amendment added a
section which would require mandatory investigations for acquisitions of
U.S. companies by foreign state-owned enterprises-clearly a response to the
attempt by the state-owned Thomson to acquire LTV.120
Time has shown, however, that the Byrd Amendment has had little actual
effect on the Exon-Florio framework or process. This is due to the fact that
under § 2170(b), CFlUS still has the discretion to determine whether a
company is truly "acting on behalf of" a foreign government or whether the
transaction "could result in control" that "could affect national security"
before beginning the investigation. 121 The Amendment also added the
following provisions: new factors the President should take into
consideration when reviewing a CFIUS transaction, such as the possibility
that critical U.S. technology could end up in the hands of various countries
identified by the State Department as state sponsors of terrorism; a
requirement for a report to Congress on each CFIUS decision made by the
President; and a provision relating to technology risk assessment. 122
117 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484,
§ 837, 106 Stat. 2315, 2463-65 (1992) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(b) (2000)). The
Conference Committee's explanation of the provisions contained in the Byrd Amendment
can be found at H.R. REP. No. 102-966, at 730.
118 138 CONG. REC. S25,878,25,948 (1992).
119 Id at 25,948-49. Other supporters of the bill made similar statements. Id. at
14,051-53 (including supporting statements by Senators James Exon (D-NE), Don Riegle
(D-MI), and Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), as well as an initial endorsement by Senator John
Warner (R-VA)).
120 § 837(a), 106 Stat. at 2464.
121 Christopher F. Corr, A Survey of United States Controls on Foreign Investment
and Operations: How Much Is Enough?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 417, 430 (1994);
§ 837, 106 Stat. at 2463-65. CFRJS presumably used this rationale to avoid the Byrd
Amendment's required forty-five-day investigation of state-owned DPW in 2006. In
Appendix B of the CF1US regulations there is a useful discussion of the impact of the
1992 addition of § 2170(b), "Mandatory Investigations." 31 C.F.R. § 800 app. B (2000).
122 § 837, 106 Stat. 2315. The Byrd Amendment also called on the President to add
two new members to CFIUS, the Director of the Office of Science and Technology
Policy and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Id. President Bill
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Later that same month, Congress added a requirement to Exon-Florio
that CFIUS provide a quadrennial report on foreign investment in the United
States to the Congress. 123 This report would include information not only on
CFIUS's activities, but also on industrial espionage. 124 Senator Riegle (D-
M1), who introduced this provision in the Senate, stated that its purpose was
"to provide the Congress with a better understanding of these concerns so
that it can adequately oversee executive branch administration of § 721.1"125
The most recent amendment to Exon-Florio came in 1994, when Congress
amended the statute to require that these quadrennial reports also include
information on industrial espionage activities "directly assisted" by foreign
governments, as opposed to the previous requirement that these reported-on
activities be those "directed" by foreign governments.1
26
F. CFIUS Regulations
The Department of the Treasury has issued a number of regulations
regarding CFIUS and its operation. 127 These regulations provide definitions,
deal with issues such as prior acquisitions, detail what transactions are and
are not covered by § 2170, provide procedures for voluntarily notifying
CFIUS of relevant transactions, flesh out the actual process that CFIUS must
follow, and provide for confidentiality of corporate information.' 28 While it
is unnecessary to review each of these regulations in this Note, the
regulations do include several sections that shed light on the meaning of
various CFIUS provisions and their legislative histories. These are relevant to
the current effort to make changes to the Exon-Florio process.
Of particular note is the discussion in Appendix A to the CFIUS
regulations. 129 This appendix discusses the various proposals and public
comments that went into the drafting of the Part 800 regulations, including
the debate over the definition of national security. 130 Various requests were
Clinton subsequently added these two positions, as well as the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, to CFIUS's membership by executive order. Exec. Order No.
12,860, 58 Fed. Reg. 47,201 (Sept. 3, 1993). For a discussion of this and one subsequent
addition of a member to CFIUS, see supra note 35.
123 Defense Production Act Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-558, § 163, 106
Stat. 4198, 4219-20 (1992).
124 Id
125 138 CONG. REc. 34,352, at 34,353 (1992).
126 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-359,
§ 809(d), 108 Stat. 3423, 3454 (1994).
127 31 C.F.R. § 800 (2005).
128 See generally id.
129 31 C.F.R. § 800 app. A, § 11 (2005).
130 Id.
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made to Treasury to define national security in the mergers and acquisitions
context by positive or negative lists, or by creating a multi-factor test.131
However, Treasury rejected these suggestions because they were too limiting
on the President's ability to affirmatively act to protect national security, and
provided insufficient guidance to corporations; rather, Treasury stated that
"national security" should be "interpreted broadly and without limitation to
particular industries."'132 The Committee also refused to issue guidelines
outside of the Code of Federal Regulations to generally describe national
security, or to issue summaries of its decisions. 133 The issuance of summaries
of the results of completed reviews, in particular, would have been harmful,
Treasury argued, because CFIUS decisions are largely based on classified
information provided by American intelligence agencies and confidential
corporate information which must be protected under § 2170.134 Finally, the
Committee also rejected bright-line tests for determining what transactions
are covered by CFIUS. 135
III. CASE STUDIES OF PROMINENT ExoN-FLORIo TRANSACTIONS
The Exon-Florio statute contains a confidentiality provision which
prevents detailed information on transactions reviewed by CFIUS from being
made public or from being revealed under a Freedom of Information Act
request.' 36 While the statute also requires that CFIUS share information on
131 Id.
132 The following text from Appendix A is highly instructive on Treasury's
approach to the lack of a definition of national security:
As is made clear in the principal legislative history... the focus of Section 721
is on transactions that could threaten to impair the national security. Although
neither the statute nor the Conference Report defines national security, the conferees
explain that it is to be interpreted broadly and without limitation to particular
industries .... Ultimately, under section 721 and the Constitution the judgment as to
whether a transaction threatens national security rests within the President's
discretion.
The regulations contemplate that persons considering transactions will exercise
their own judgment and discretion in determining whether to give notice to the
Committee with respect to a particular transaction.
Id.
13 3 Id.
134 Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 136-39.
135 31 C.F.R. § 800 app. A, § II.
136 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (2000) ("Any information or documentary material
filed with the President or the President's designee ... shall be exempt from disclosure
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specific transactions with Congress, 137 the sharing of this information is
usually done in closed-door meetings so as to avoid a conflict with the
confidentiality provision.' 38 Therefore, much of the information which is in
the public domain regarding individual CFIUS transactions is incomplete and
is often provided by the very companies which are involved in the
transactions.139 Because of these restrictions on the flow of information, most
of the detailed information the public has on the specifics of transactions
covered by CFIUS is from those transactions which prompted widespread
public or congressional attention: the Thomson/LTV transaction, the
CATIC/MAMCO transaction, the CNOOC/Unocal transaction, and the
DPW/P&O transaction. An analysis of these transactions, and an
appreciation of the process which similar but less high-profile transactions
face, are essential to understanding how the Exon-Florio statute has
traditionally been implemented and why changes to the statute have been
proposed.
A. CA TIC/MAMCO Transaction
In 1990, MAMCO Manufacturing, an American aircraft parts
manufacturer based in Seattle, Washington, was acquired by the China
International Trust & Investment Corporation ("CATIC"), a company which
had strong ties to the People's Liberation Army of the People's Republic of
China. 140 While a voluntary notice of the transaction had been filed by
CATIC with CFIUS before the transaction was finalized, the deal was
under [the Freedom of Information Act], and no such information ... may be made
public .... ).
137 Id. ("Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent disclosure to either
House of Congress or to any... committee or subcommittee of the Congress.").
138 See, e.g., Dubai Purchase of US. Port Facilities, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Domestic and Int'l Monetary Pol'y, Trade and Tech. of the H. Fin. Services Comm.,
109th Cong. (2006), available at LEXIS CQ Congressional Testimony Database
[hereinafter Dubai Purchase Hearings] (prepared statement of Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Kimmitt).
139 Companies involved in mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers often issue press
releases which mention intent to file with CFIUS or state that the transaction has already
been approved by CFIUS. See, e.g., Hampson Industries Gets US Approval to Buy Coast
Composites, AFXNEWS.COM, Dec. 6, 2005, available at LEXIS News & Business
Database; Stephanie Kirchgaessner, CFIUS Gives Toshiba Nod over Westinghouse Deal,
FIN. TIMES (London), June 5, 2006, at 28 (stating that "[p]eople familiar with the
transaction" had confirmed that CF1US approved Toshiba's acquisition of
Westinghouse).
14 0 THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SELECT COMMITTEE ON U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY, PRC ACQUISITION OF U.S. TECHNOLOGY 44-45 (1999), available at
http://www.house.gov/coxreport/pdf/chl.pdf [hereinafter "Cox COMMrIrEE REPORT"].
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completed before CFIUS's review was finished. After CFIUS's review,
investigation, and a unanimous CFIUS recommendation regarding national
security concerns, President George H. W. Bush ordered the divestiture of
MAMCO by CATIC on the grounds that national security was threatened by
CATIC's ties to the Chinese military, the fact that CATIC would gain
"unique access" to U.S. aerospace companies through its ownership of
MAMCO, and that some of the technology produced by MAMCO was
export-controlled. 14 1 The Administration also rejected efforts by CATIC to
sell MAMCO to another Chinese company which had similar ties to the
Chinese government. 142
The CATIC/MAMCO transaction remains the only transaction that has
ever been formally blocked by a U.S. President after a negative
recommendation from CFIUS. 143
B. Thomson/L TV Transaction
In 1992, Congress and the American media focused a great deal of
attention on another CFIUS transaction, generating perhaps the largest
amount of news coverage of any CFRUS transaction prior to the CNOOC
transaction in 2005. Thomson-CSF, Inc., a French state-owned company,
participated in a complicated and contentious bidding process for the right to
acquire LTV Corporation, an American steel company that also owned an
141 Id. at 45; see also Andrew Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of
Aviation Concern to China, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1990, at 1. Though these were the
official reasons stated by the Bush Administration for the divestiture order, some have
pointed to another possible motivation: the massacre by the Chinese government of
dissidents in Tiananmen Square had only recently occurred, and the administration
wished to express its disapproval to the Chinese government by denying it access to the
technology it wished to gain from MAMCO. George Graham, Thomson Tries to Reframe
Bid for US Missile Maker, FIN. TIMES (London), July 7, 1992, at 6.
142 COX COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 140, at 45-46.
143 E.g., Organization for International Investment, Fact Sheet on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS), July 2005, http://www.ofii.org/factsheet.htm;
Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Robert Kimmitt, Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury). This statistic--often cited by critics of CFIUS-however, is
misleading. In fact, the full impact of the CFIUS process should be measured based on
the transactions that do not occur because companies know in advance they will not
receive CFIUS approval and so do not attempt a transaction, as well as by the number of
companies that decide to drop their bids after learning that a negative recommendation to
the President by CFIUS is likely. This recently occurred when an Israeli company, Check
Point Software Technologies, Ltd., dropped its bid to acquire an American software
security technology company, Sourcefire, Inc. Ran Dagoni, Analysts Check Point-
Sourcefire Deal Was Doomed, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE - ASIA AFRICA INTELLIGENCE WIRE,
Mar. 27, 2006, at 1.
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aerospace division. 144 This bidding war pitted Thomson, partnered with the
Carlyle Group, a well-connected American investment company, against
Martin Marietta, an American aerospace company which would later merge
with Lockheed to form Lockheed Martin.' 45 The details of the bidding
process were a textbook example of the complexities of the mergers and
acquisitions process, even prior to the involvement of CFIUS and
Congress. 146 Ultimately, Thomson and Carlyle's bid was selected, and the
companies planned for Thomson to acquire the LTV Missile Division and
Carlyle to acquire the LTV Aircraft Division.147 Once the deal was
completed with LTV, the transaction needed to gain CFIUS approval.
Thomson filed a voluntary notice with CFIUS regarding the proposed
transaction, and on April 21, 1992, CFIUS began its initial thirty-day review
of the transaction. 148
Prior to initiating the CFIUS review, Thomson failed to develop plans in
conjunction with the Department of Defense in order to mitigate any
concerns relating to the missile division, which held classified DOD
contracts. 149 Martin Marietta exploited the concerns which clearly arose from
this situation as a means of fighting the Thomson takeover. 150 Martin
Marietta and other concerned parties argued that Thomson's acquisition of
LTV was a clear national security concern, pointing to the fact that Thomson
had sold weapons to Iraq in the past, thus raising the specter that LTV's
technology could also find its way, at Thomson's direction, to America's
enemies.151 Multiple hearings were held on Capitol Hill, putting political
pressure both on Thomson and on CFIUS. 152 The Department of Defense
conducted extensive negotiations with Thomson regarding potential
144 Robert N. Cappucci, Note, Amending the Treatment of Defense Production
Enterprises Under the U.S. Exon-Florio Provision: A Move Toward Protectionism or
Globalism?, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 652, 666-67 (1993).
145 W. Robert Shearen, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation
Susceptible to Abuse, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1729, 1763 n.241 (1993). Ironically, it was
actually a bankruptcy court which selected the Thomson/Carlyle bid over the Marietta
bid, thus prompting the public and congressional uproar discussed above. Id.
14 6 See, e.g., Chronology of the Sale of LTV's Defense Units, AEROSPACE DAILY,
Aug. 12, 1992, at 253.
147 Cappucci, supra note 144, at 667.
148 Chronology of the Sale ofLTV's Defense Units, supra note 146, at 254.
149 See id at 253.
150 Graham, supra note 141, at 6.
151 See, e.g., Brian Bremner, They Don't Let Just Anyone Buy a Defense Contractor,
Bus. WK., July 20, 1992, at 41 ("The U. S. defense Establishment carried out a blistering
behind-the-scenes assault on Thomson over its status as a French government holding
and its past business dealings with Iraq.").
152 See supra notes 106-07.
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mitigation agreements but ultimately no agreement was reached and the
DOD expressed its desire that the transaction simply not occur. 153 The strong
opposition of the DOD was to be expected, because Thomson had provided
Iraq with radar equipment for use during the Persian Gulf War and because
the Defense Intelligence Agency found that the Thomson/LTV transaction
presented greater security risks than any of over 200 such transactions that it
had reviewed.154
Ultimately, Thomson withdrew its bid for LTV's missile division,
probably after learning that CFLUS would recommend to President George
H. W. Bush that he block the transaction. However, one effect of the
confidentiality of the CFRUS process is that it is somewhat unclear exactly
what transpired in this case. Some reports indicate that CFIUS voted to
recommend that the President block the transaction, but Thomson withdrew
its bid before the recommendation was sent to the President. 155 Other sources
say that Thomson withdrew in the face of a likely negative
recommendation. 156 Still others maintain that CFIUS was prepared to
approve the acquisition, but only under very stringent national security
controls that Thomson could not accept, leading Thomson to withdraw its
bid.157
C. CNOOC/Unocal Transaction
In the summer of 2005, the third largest state-owned Chinese oil
company, the China National Offshore Petroleum Company, Ltd.
("CNOOC") announced it would attempt to acquire Unocal, an American oil
company that owned oil reserves around the world.158 Unocal was already in
the midst of negotiations with Chevron, another American oil company,
153 See, e.g., Cappucci, supra note 144, at 667-68.
154 Theodore H. Moran, Foreign Acquisitions of Critical U.S. Industries: Where
Should the United States Draw the Line?, WASH. Q., Spring 1993, at 61, 69.
155 Cappucci, supra note 144, at 667-68.
156 "Negative recommendation" can be found at Graham, supra note 141. "Likely
negative recommendation" can be found at Chronology of the Sale of LTV's Defense
Units, supra note 146, at 254.
157 "Stringent controls required for approval" can be found in a paper issued by the
RAND Foundation. MARK A. LORELL ET AL., GOING GLOBAL? U.S. GOVERNMENT AND
THE DEFENSE AEROSPACE INDUSTRY 173-74 (RAND Corp. 2002), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographreports/2005/MRI 537.pdf.
158 Ron Orol, Spooked by CNOOC, 12 CORP. CouNs., Oct. 2005, at 94 [hereinafter
Orol, Spooked by CNOOC].
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which had offered $16.4 billion to purchase Unocal. 159 CNOOC offered a
higher bid of $18.5 billion. 160
Negative congressional reaction to the proposed acquisition was evident
almost immediately. Numerous members of Congress wrote letters to
Secretary of the Treasury John Snow urging that the transaction be reviewed
and blocked by CFIUS due to the national security concerns they saw
associated with China, a Communist regime, gaining control of an American
company with extensive oil reserves. 161 Various members of Congress, as
well as prominent commentators, raised serious arguments that in light of
U.S. dependence on foreign oil, rising oil prices, and China's increasing
military, political, and economic strength, it would be irresponsible for the
country to permit China to acquire an American oil company. 162
159 Collier, supra note 25, at A14.
160 Orol, supra note 25, at 5.
161 See, e.g., Grassley, CNOOC-Unocal Deal, supra note 9 (joint press release with
Sen. Max Baucus of Montana) (including the text of the Grassley-Baucus letter calling
for CFIUS's careful review); Collier, supra note 25, at A14 (listing lawmakers who wrote
to President Bush urging that he block the CNOOC transaction). It should also be noted
that the CNOOC/Unocal transaction was not the first to originate in China which raised
national security concerns in the United States. For example, in 2003, Hutchison
Whampoa Ltd., a Hong Kong-based company, was forced to withdraw its $250 million
bid to acquire Global Grossing Ltd. after realizing that CFIUS would not approve its
transaction due to concerns of the Department of Defense that Hutchison Whampoa had
ties to the Chinese military and thus the transfer of control of a U.S. company with
sophisticated telecommunications technology would be a threat to national security. See
James A. Lewis, New Objectives for CFIUS: Foreign Ownership, Critical Infrastructure,
and Communications Interception, 57 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 468-69 (2005); Orol,
Spooked by CNOOC, supra note 158.
162 Editorial, National Security, China and the Unocal Deal, WASH. TIMES, July 5,
2005, at A18 (discussing generally the oil and national security link in this context).
While most commentary focused on oil, some critics of the CNOOC transaction also
referenced the fact that Unocal owned the only remaining rare earth minerals mine in the
United States. The National Security Implications of the Possible Merger of the China
National Offshore Oil Corporation with Unocal Corporation: Hearings Before the H.
Armed Services Comm., 109th Cong. (2005), available at LEXIS CQ Congressional
Testimony Database [hereinafter National Security Implications Hearings] (statement of
Frank Gaffney, Jr., President and CEO, Center for Security Policy), prepared remarks
available at http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/GaffneyChinaTestimonyf7122.pdf.
That mine currently is not operating, leaving China as the supplier of eighty-eight percent
of the world's rare earth minerals. Id. Interestingly (or perhaps disturbingly), two Chinese
companies, San Huan New Materials and China Non-Ferrous Materials, acquired
Magnequench, an Indiana-based manufacturer of eighty-five percent of the U.S.
military's rare-earth magnets, in 1995. David Lague, China Corners Market in a High-
Tech Necessity, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 22, 2006, at 11, available at
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/0l/22/business/rare.php. After promising to keep
Magnequench's production in the United States, China slowly moved the company to
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It was at this point that various members began to introduce legislation
that would have prevented the transaction.163 Hearings were held in which
both the CNOOC transaction and potential changes to the Exon-Florio statute
were discussed. 164 CNOOC had originally claimed that it was confident it
would win CFIUS approval and even secured approval from the Chinese
government to raise its bid price from the original $67 per share to $69 per
share. 165 Further, the Chinese Foreign Ministry expressed that government's
disapproval of any U.S. attempt to block the transaction.1 66 Despite this,
CNOOC ultimately withdrew its bid, clearing the way for Chevron to acquire
Unocal. 167 The increased attention paid to CFIUS, and specifically to
Treasury's leadership of the Committee, provided the impetus for various
members of Congress to continue to introduce bills designed to change the
Exon-Florio legislative framework even after this withdrawal. 168
D. Dubai Ports World/P&O Transaction
In January 2006, all twelve CFIUS member agencies gave their approval
for Dubai Ports World ("DPW"), a company owned by the Emir of Dubai,
one of the member states of the United Arab Emirates, to acquire Peninsular
China. Id. (quoting Sen. James Inhofe). Today, the United States does not have a
domestic rare earth mineral supplier for critical defense-related magnets. Id. In early
2006, the U.S. Department of Energy released a report stating that the largest--or even
only-national security concern arising out of the CNOOC attempt to acquire Unocal
was related to the U.S. company's rare earth mining operations. False Alarm on US Oil:
But the All-Clear is Too Late for China and Unocal Investors, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
9, 2006, at 14.
163 A number of different proposals to stop the transaction were submitted,
including one that would have required the Secretaries of Defense, Energy, and
Homeland Security to review the transaction and to give their approval in order for it to
proceed. See, e.g., Legislation Would Require Extra Review of CNOOC Bid, WASH.
POST, July 26, 2005, at D2. This approval would have been in addition to that required
from CFIUS. Id.
164 See Orol, Spooked by CNOOC, supra note 158, at 94.
165 Ben White, Unocal Reveals Portrait of Negotiations; Chief Executive Said
CNOOC Could Beat Chevron With Higher Bid, WASH. POST, July 26, 2005, at D 1.
166 Chris Baker, China Tells US. Not to Meddle in Bid for California Oil Giant,
WASH. TIMES, June 30, 2005, at Al. The Chinese Foreign Ministry made statements
directed toward the Congress-warning it to leave the deal alone-that were far more
confrontational than one would normally expect from diplomats, and that some members
of Congress considered inappropriate. Id. at Al1. Therefore, Congress was not the only
political body trying to use its weight to affect the outcome of the battle between
CNOOC and Chevron to acquire Unocal.
167 David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Company Drops Bid to Buy
US. Oil Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3,2005, at Al.
168 Corr, supra note 11, at 38.
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and Oriental Steam Navigation Company ("P&O") in a $6.8 billion deal. 169
P&O, a British company, operates port terminals in countries around the
world, including the United States. 170 This acquisition would have given
DPW operational control-not ownership-of eleven terminals in six U.S.
ports. 171
The Treasury Department explained that each of the twelve CFIUS
member agencies conducted its own independent reviews of the proposed
transaction; additionally, CFIUS invited the Departments of Transportation
and Energy to take part in the review process. 17 2 Treasury also explained that
an intelligence assessment of the impact of the DPW acquisition of P&O was
provided by U.S. intelligence agencies. 173 Perhaps even more interestingly,
the Administration revealed some of the details of mitigation agreements that
had been negotiated with DPW prior to CFIUS's decision not to undertake a
formal forty-five-day investigation. 174 These mitigation measures were put
into place after a representative of the Department of Homeland Security
raised concerns about the deal; once the measures were put into place, DHS
dropped its objections to allowing the deal to proceed. 175 While not all of the
mitigation measures were made public, one that was revealed involved a
commitment by DPW to cooperate with any future investigations by the U.S.
government of the firm's port operations. 176
169 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, CFIUS and the Protection of the
National Security in the Dubai Ports World Bid for Port Operations (Feb. 24, 2006),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4071.htm [hereinafter Department of the Treasury
Press Release Feb. 24, 2006]. Such a public acknowledgement of a CFIUS approval is
unusual for CFUS, considering the confidentiality provision, and can probably be
attributed to the need to respond to the enormous political pressure put on the
Administration during the DPW controversy.
170 Id.
171 For a list of these terminals and ports, see United States Department of
Homeland Security Fact Sheet, supra note 13.
172 Department of the Treasury Press Release Feb. 24, 2006, supra note 169.
173 Id.
174 Ted Bridis, Department Initially Opposed Ports Deal, SFGATE.cOM, Feb. 25,
2006, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2006/02/25/national/wl 64620S06.DTL.
175 Id. A Homeland Security representative revealed to Congress that these
mitigation measures included DPW agreeing to make various security initiatives with
which it had been cooperating mandatory, including the Container Security Initiative, and
agreeing to provide the U.S. government with unlimited access to all written records
about its U.S. operations without a warrant. Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138
(prepared statement of Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Jackson).
176 US. Puts Strings on Arab Deal for Ports, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Feb.
23, 2006, at Al.
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In late February 2006, as the public became aware of the approval of the
DPW ports deal, members of Congress from both houses began to express
their displeasure with CFIUS for approving the transaction. 177 The strength
of the opposition to the deal is illustrated by the fact that the Senate Majority
Leader, the Senate Minority Leader, the Speaker of the House, and the House
Minority Leader all publicly expressed their strong reservations about
DPW's presence in U.S. ports. 178 Legislation was introduced in Congress
that would have required the Administration to begin a new forty-five-day
CFIUS investigation of the DPW transaction. 179 Before this legislation was
approved, however, CFJUS began a forty-five-day investigation at the
request of DPW. 180 Congressional hearings were held to discuss the national
security implications of the deal and the CFIUS review process itself.' 81
In response to criticism of CFIUS's approval of the deal, the
Administration and President Bush himself argued that national security
would not be harmed in any way by the operation of DPW within these U.S.
ports. 182 Furthermore, the President and his supporters argued that the UAE
177 See, e.g., Alec Magnet, Opposition to Dubai Control of Port Grows Among
Members of Congress, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 16, 2006, at 1 (listing members of both the House
and Senate from both parties who were opposed to the deal).
178 Press Release, Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, Frist Calls for Hold on Sea
Ports Deal (Feb. 21, 2006),
http://frist.senate.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease-id=22
69&Month=2&Year=2006; Press Release, Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid, Reid:
Senate Must Act to Ensure Security of America's Ports (Feb. 21, 2006),
http://reid.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=251796&&year=2006&; Press Release,
Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert, Speaker Hastert Sends Letter to President Bush
Regarding Moratorium and Review of Seaports Deal (Feb. 21, 2006),
http://speaker.house.gov/library/intrelations/060221 Seaport.shtml; Press Release, House
Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi: Congress Must Conduct Thorough Review of Port
Security Deal (Feb. 21, 2006),
http://www.house.gov/pelosi/press/releases/FebO6/PortSecurity.html.
179 152 CONG. REC. S1489, 1506 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2006).
180 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, CFIUS Welcomes Dubai Ports
World's Announcement to Submit to New Review (Feb. 26, 2006),
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4072.htm [hereinafter Department of the Treasury
Press Release Feb. 26, 2006].
181 See, e.g., Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138.
182 President Bush stated, "If there was any chance that this transaction would
jeopardize the security of the United States, it would not go forward." Press Release, The
White House, Fact Sheet: The CFIUS Process and the DP World Transaction (Feb. 22,
2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/print/20060222-11 .html
[hereinafter White House Fact Sheet]. The White House argued that the Coast Guard and
United States Customs and Border Protection provide security at ports, not terminal
operators, and thus the change in management from P&O to DPW would not affect
security, that appropriate mitigation/security agreements had been put into place to
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could be trusted in this situation because it had provided significant
assistance to and cooperation with the United States in the War on Terror and
had been one of the first countries to agree to participate in the Container
Security Initiative that allowed DHS inspections of cargo bound for the
United States at point-of-origin foreign seaports. 183 Critics of CFIUS's
decision rejected these arguments, pointing out that the UAE was the home
of some of the September 11 hijackers and the source of some of their
finding. 184 They argued that a UAE-owned company could thus not be
trusted with port security. 185
Ultimately, the arguments of the opponents of the deal won out in
Congress; the House Appropriations Committee voted 62-2 on March 8,
2006 to block the transfer of the port terminals to DPW.186 That same day
Senator John Warner read a press release on the Senate floor in which DPW
announced its intention to "transfer" the U.S. terminal operation rights it
would acquire with its purchase of P&O "to a still-unnamed American
company." 187 As of May 2006, DPW had yet to sell its U.S. ports assets to an
American company, though around thirty companies had expressed interest
in a deal. 188 Thus, DPW has actually been operating the terminals that were
address security concerns, and that language about DPW "owning" or "operating" U.S.
ports was overplayed and misleading. See, e.g., id DHS also pointed out that media
reports that DPW would "operate" or "control" the ports in question were overblown; in
fact, DPW would only acquire the right to operate and manage a limited number of
terminals within each port: two of fourteen terminals in Baltimore, one of five terminals
in Philadelphia, one of three terminals in Miami, two of five terminals in New Orleans,
four of twelve terminals in Houston, and one of four terminals in Newark/Elizabeth.
Department of Homeland Security Fact Sheet, supra note 13.
183 See, e.g., White House Fact Sheet, supra note 182.
184 See, e.g., Editorial, Port Insecurity, N.Y. POST, Feb. 14, 2006, at 26; Frank
Gaffney, Jr., Editorial, Port of Entry, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2006, at A17 (editorial by a
conservative national security expert opposing the DPW transaction); Alec Magnet,
Schumer Calls for Probe of Arab Port Deal, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 14, 2006, at 2 (discussing
opposition of liberal Sen. Chuck Schumer (D-NY), to the DPW transaction); 152 CONG.
REC. S 1489, 1508-09 (daily ed. Feb. 27, 2006) (floor statement of Sen. Susan Collins, R-
ME, opposing the DPW transaction).
185 See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 184, at A17 (comparing the DPW deal to
contracting out airport security to the UAE); see also Press Release, Senator Harry Reid,
The Senate Must Act to Consider Port Security (Feb. 23, 2006),
http://reid.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=251860&&year=2006&.
186 Sanger, supra note 15, at Al.
187 Id.
188 Peter T. Leach & Rick Eyerdam, Time to Spare, FLORIDA SHIPPER, May 22,
2006, at 12.
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at issue during the ports controversy since it agreed to sell its rights to those
terminals in March, and has done so without incident.18 9
While DPW's decision to relinquish its rights to these U.S. port terminals
ended the controversy surrounding this specific transaction, it marked a
renewed attention and debate concerning CFJUS issues, which had lessened
somewhat since the termination of the CNOOC transaction. In response to
DPW, numerous members of Congress began to discuss the possibility of
making major changes to the Exon-Florio statute and proceeded to introduce
legislation to that effect. 190
IV. RECENT PROPOSED CHANGES TO EXON-FLORIO
The strong congressional reactions to CNOOC's attempt to acquire
Unocal and DPW's ultimately successful attempt to acquire P&O not only
put political pressure on CNOOC to withdraw its bid and on the Bush
Administration to block the DPW transaction, but also led to efforts in
Congress to make changes to the Exon-Florio statute. 191 This movement to
amend the statute was also fueled by the release of a September 2005 report
by the Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), which was highly
critical of the Department of the Treasury's chairmanship of CFIUS and its
implementation of Exon-Florio.' 92
A. GAO Recommendations
In a September 2005 report issued by the GAO, the investigative agency
found the implementation of the Exon-Florio statute by CFIUS to be lacking
in a number of areas and made recommendations for changes to the statute
and the CFIUS process. 193 For example, the GAO report criticized the
manner in which Treasury interprets national security under Exon-Florio,
arguing that the Treasury interpretation is too narrow, and called for
Congress to specify clear factors that must be considered when determining
189 Id.
190 See infra text accompanying notes 197-200.
191 See Corr, supra note 11, at 38; Carl Hulse & Heather Timmons, Lawmakers Plan
for New Security Reviews, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A16 (stating that lawmakers
viewed the DPW situation as "proof that the existing system [CFIUS] had broken down,"
and including an acknowledgement by Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert M.
Kimmitt that changes to Exon-Florio were likely).
192 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEFENSE TRADE: ENHANCEMENTS TO THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF ExON-FLORIO COULD STRENGTHEN THE LAW's EFFECTIVENESS 3-5
(2005).
193 Id. at 21-24.
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if an acquisition poses a national security threat. 194 GAO also called for
Congress to extend the time allowed for the review process by statute, argued
against and recommended an end to the practice of companies withdrawing
and re-filing their notices at the request of CFIUS in order to buy time for the
review, and sought more transparency regarding CFIUS's deliberations and
called for more reporting to Congress by CFIUS on its actions.
195
B. Congressional Proposals to Amend Exon-Florio
In the midst of the furor in Congress over the CNOOC and DPW
controversies, numerous members of Congress began to consider the need to
make changes to Exon-Florio in order to improve the statute's
effectiveness. 196 Hearings were held that addressed the CNOOC acquisition
attempt and the concerns raised by the GAO's 2005 report on CFIUS.
Several members of Congress submitted various proposals to change the
Exon-Florio statute.
For example, Senator Richard Shelby, the chairman of the Senate
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee, introduced an amendment
to a defense bill in August 2005 that would have made significant changes to
Exon-Florio. 197 Shelby's proposal would have: (1) added economic security
to national security as the focus of CFIUS reviews, (2) given committees in
the Senate and House the ability to order CFIUS to undertake an
investigation of state-owned foreign entities even if CFIUS did not seek a
194 Id. at 11-13.
195 Id. at 2-21. During 2005 congressional hearings, the GAO presented its findings
regarding Treasury's implementation of Exon-Florio. Foreign Investments in the United
States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 109th
Cong. (2005) available at LEXIS CQ Congressional Testimony Database [hereinafter
Foreign Investments Hearings] (testimony of Katherine Schinasi, Managing Director,
Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability Office, and Ann
Calvaresi-Barr, Director, Industrial Base Issues, Government Accountability Office).
GAO representatives argued that the "many disputes" between CFIUS member agencies
regarding various transactions were evidence of the broken nature of the CFIUS process.
The GAO representatives also repeatedly emphasized the report's finding that Treasury
used a definition of national security that was not strict enough to protect against real
threats and that it forced this definition on other member agencies. They were also
concerned that based on the cases they had reviewed it appeared that Treasury did not
always consider the factors that were provided by the Exon-Florio statute. However, the
representatives also expressed agreement with Treasury that the term "national security"
should remain undefined, because the lack of a definition provided needed flexibility.
196 See Corr supra note 11, at 38; Hulse & Timmons supra note 191, at A16.
197 Orol, Spooked by CNOOC, supra note 158, at 94; Ron Orol, Defense Bill Clears
Sans CFIUS Move, DAILY DEAL, Nov. 16, 2005 [hereinafter Orol, Defense Bill].
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forty-five-day investigation on its own, and (3) required additional reporting
by CFIUS to Congress, among other things. 198
Senator James Inhofe also submitted a proposal to amend Exon-Florio.
Known as the "Foreign Investment Act of 2005," Inhofe's proposal would
have made a number of sweeping changes to the statute. 199 For example, this
proposal would have (1) changed the period for CFRUS reviews from thirty
to sixty days, (2) required that the findings of a review be reported not simply
to the President, but also to the relevant committee of jurisdiction in the
House and Senate, (3) made mandatory those factors relating to analysis of
national security concerns that previously had been considered discretionary,
and added a final factor relating to this analysis that included both economic
security and energy needs, (4) enhanced reporting requirements to the
Congress, (5) required that CFIUS complete reviews even when notice is
withdrawn by a party, and (6) perhaps most significantly, provided that after
a presidential determination to allow a transaction, Congress within ten days
could block the transaction by passage of a joint resolution. 200
Ultimately, both the Shelby and Inhofe proposals to amend Exon-Florio
were excluded from the 2005 defense bill.20 1 However, both Shelby and
Inhofe indicated at that time that they intended to re-introduce amendments
to the Exon-Florio statute in the future.202 A "Sense of the Congress"
resolution was attached to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2006 that stated that the President should establish a strategic plan to
deal with the rise of China in economic, military, and diplomatic arenas. 20 3
This plan was required to demonstrate:
[a]ctions to review laws and regulations governing the Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), including exploring
whether the definition of national security should include the potential
198 See Orol, Spooked by CNOOC, supra note 158 at 94.
199 Foreign Investment Security Act of 2005, S. 1797, 109th Cong. (2005).
200 Id. § 2. These changes reflect in part the GAO's concerns about the process of
withdrawing a notice and re-filing, the limited time available for CFIUS member
agencies to review a transaction, and requiring more transparency in the CFIUS process
by increasing the reporting requirements to Congress. See supra note 19 1.
201 Orol, Defense Bill, supra note 197.
202 Orol, Defense Bill, supra note 197; US Sen Shelby Text: Resuming GSE, Credit
Agency Reform Push, MARKET NEWS INT'L, Jan. 31, 2006; see also Stephanie
Kirchgaessner & Edward Alden, US Plans Reform of Scrutiny Panel to Reassure
Investors, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 2006, at 11 (stating that the Bush Administration
was attempting to "headoff pressure from Congress for new legislation, which would be
likely to push the administration to use CFIUS more aggressively to protect [U.S.]
'economic security."').
203 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163,
§ 1234(b)(1), 119 Stat. 3136, 3471 (2006).
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impact on national economic security as a criterion to be reviewed, and
whether the chairmanship of CFIUS should be transferred from the
Secretary of the Treasury to a more appropriate executive branch agency.
20 4
Soon after this, numerous other bills were submitted in Congress dealing
with potential changes to Exon-Florio.20 5 These numerous proposals,
however, were generally pushed to the side as Senator Shelby's bill-
modified from its previous version-was approved by the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee on a 20-0 vote, and a bill primarily
championed by House Majority Whip Roy Blunt was approved by the House
Financial Services Committee in a vote of 64-0.206 The Shelby bill, seen as
less favorable to business, would: designate the Secretary of Defense as the
Vice Chairman of CFIUS; allow CFIUS member agencies to unilaterally
extend a review from thirty to sixty days; require detailed reporting by
CFIUS to various members of Congress at multiple stages of the review
process; require that CFIUS notify the governors of states relevant to a
transaction of the proposed transaction; add the Director of National
Intelligence to CFIUS's membership; enshrine CFIUS in statute (rather than
executive order); and require investigations of transactions involving critical
infrastructure and energy assets, and more. 20 7 In July 2006, however, Senator
204 § 1234(c)(8), 119 Stat. at 3472.
205 Between March 7 and March 9, 2006, alone, the following bills were introduced
in Congress, each of which modified or affected Exon-Florio in different ways: National
Defense Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2006, H.R. 4881, 109th Cong. § 3
(2006) (requiring additional factors to be considered in CFIUS reviews, addition of
annual reports, modifications to notice system, etc.); H.R. 4885, 109th Cong. (2006)
(prohibiting CFIUS from approving any merger or acquisition involving a company
owned by a foreign state that does not recognize United Nations member states,
presumably implying Israel); Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Reform Act, H.R. 4915, 109th Cong. § 6 (2006) (implementing Executive Order 11,858
as amended in statutory form and making numerous changes); Protect America First Act
of 2006, H.R. 4917, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006) (requiring CF1US to notify Congress upon
receipt of a voluntary notice, etc.); Foreign Investment National Security Review Act of
2006, H.R. 4929, 109th Cong. (2006) (making numerous substantive changes to Exon-
Florio's provisions as well as implementing CFIUS by statute); U.S. National Security
Protection Act of 2006, S. 2380, 109th Cong. (2006) (making numerous substantial
changes to Exon-Florio, including adding the Director of National Intelligence and the
Director of Central Intelligence to CFIUS, and making the Secretaries of Defense and
Homeland Security the vice-chairs of the Committee). The frequency with which bills
were being introduced earlier this year to amend CFIUS demonstrates the relevance of
this Note's analysis to statutory changes which are likely to occur and which may have a
significant impact on national and economic policy.
206 Richard E. Cohen, Steaming Toward Dry Dock?, NAT'L J., July 8, 2006, at 40.
207 See, e.g., Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2006, S. 3549, 109th
Cong. (2006); see also Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Senate Panel Backs Tougher Takeover
2006]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
John Warner (R-VA) blocked an attempt by Senator Shelby to have his bill
approved by the full Senate on a "fast track" basis without debate. 208
The bill proposed by Representative Blunt in the House was generally
viewed more favorably by groups concerned about the possibility that
"reforms" to Exon-Florio would go too far and undermine the country's open
investment policy. 20 9 Blunt's bill eliminates the loophole that developed in
regard to the Byrd Amendment by requiring investigations of transactions in
which the acquiring company is controlled by a foreign government; it also
makes the Secretary of Homeland Security the vice chairman of CFIUS,
requires that CFIUS provide a report to various members of Congress on the
completion of an investigation (rather than on every individual covered
transaction), requires semi-annual reports to Congress, addresses the
enforcement of mitigation agreements, requires investigations of transactions
involving critical infrastructure, clarifies that national security includes
"homeland security" and "critical infrastructure," and more. 210
Though the Bush Administration had not taken an official position on
these bills as of early July 2006, one of its representatives speaking before a
congressional committee seemed to indicate that some of the changes
included therein might be acceptable to the Administration. 211 As of the time
Review, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2006, at 9; Ron Orol, CFIUS Gets Overhaul,
DAILY DEAL, Apr. 3, 2006; Amy Fagan, Port Security Measures Advance in Congress;
CFIUS Revamping, More Funds Proposed, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2006, at A4.
Originally, the version of the Shelby bill that the Banking Committee approved also
included a provision that would have required the government to "rank" countries based
on their "relationships with the United States and their potential for diversions of
military-sensitive technologies." Cohen, supra note 206, at 41. This provision was very
unpopular with businesses, and Senator Shelby ultimately removed it from the bill after
the committee vote. Id. It should also be noted that "Pentagon officials informed staffers
to ... [Senator] Shelby that they oppose" the provision that would make the Defense
Secretary the vice chairman of CFIUS. Id. at 40-41.
208 Id.
209 See Orol, supra note 17.
210 Reform of National Security Reviews of Foreign Direct Investments Act,
H.R. 5337, 109th Cong. (2006); see also H.R. REP. No. 109-523, at 9-10 (2006);
Stephanie Kirchgaessner, Bill Seeks to Tighten Security Review of Foreign Investors, FIN.
TIMES (London), Apr. 28, 2006, at 8; Cohen, supra note 206, at 40-41.
211 Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs Clay Lowery told
the Committee:
Reforms should address two broad principles: U.S. national security imperatives in
the post-9/11 environment and the need to continue welcoming investment in the
U.S. and creating good jobs for American workers.
To advance those principles, the Administration supports improving
communications with Congress on CFIUS matters. The Administration also
welcomes other reforms to the CFIUS process, including those that enhance
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this Note goes to publication, it is uncertain which-if any-of these bills
will ultimately be enacted. Therefore, it is important to analyze these
proposed amendments in light of the need to balance the promotion of an
open foreign investment policy with the robust national security strategy that
is crucial to protecting the United States in the post-September 11 world.
V. PRESERVING THE NATIONAL SECURITY-OPEN INVESTMENT BALANCE
National security is and should be the primary concern of the United
States government, and therefore CFJUS certainly serves an important
national interest.212 Threats to our country's national security come in a
variety of forms, whether from state actors like Iran or terrorist groups like
al-Qaeda. 213 In the aftermath of the attacks on the United States on
September 11, 2001 by al-Qaeda, and in the midst of the War on Terror, the
accountability, preserve the attractiveness of the United States for foreign
investment, focus resources on transactions that present national security issues,
ensure due consideration of the nature of the acquirer and assets to be acquired,
strengthen the role of the intelligence community, and improve CFIUS monitoring
of mitigation agreements. The CFIUS process should first and foremost ensure U.S.
national security but should not unnecessarily discourage legitimate investment in
U.S. businesses that will provide income, innovation, and employment for
Americans.
Foreign Investments in US.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and Int'l
Monetary Pol'y, Trade, and Tech. of the H. Fin. Services Comm., 109th Cong. (2006),
available at LEXIS CQ Congressional Testimony Database (statement of Clay Lowery,
Assist. Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs).
212 This view is held not only by the author, but by the Bush Administration as well.
Robert Kimmitt, Comment, America Seeks to Balance Investment and Security, FIN.
TtMES, Jan. 27, 2006 ("Promotion of an open investment policy at home does not mean
national security concerns are secondary to economic considerations. A government
official has no higher priority than protecting national security.").
213 See, e.g., Christopher R. Fenton, Note, US. Policy Towards Foreign Direct
Investment Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 195, 198-99 (2002). Fenton's Note argues, correctly, that the
threat to the United States from decentralized terrorist groups probably necessitates a
shift in CFIUS's approach to transactions which may affect national security. Id. at 200.
Given that other governments may have export control laws which are more lax than our
own (or even simply do not have the same level of concern about terrorism that the U.S.
has), CF1US should consider the possibility that a merger or acquisition could result in an
improper transfer of U.S. technology at a later point in time. Id. at 232-33. CFIUS also
should consider homeland security needs, such as the protection of telecommunications
systems, in making national security decisions. Id. at 235. The Bush Administration has
taken this goal seriously, as evidenced by its investigation of Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone's attempt to acquire Verio. Id. Finally, CFIUS should examine transactions to
determine the probability that the merger would make it easier for terrorist groups to gain
access to sensitive information. Id. at 237-42.
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Bush Administration has significantly enhanced the level of scrutiny
provided by CFIUS over transactions which might affect national security
and adjusted its CFIJS review process to reflect a post-September 11
conception of security needs.214  Additionally, recent CFIUS cases
demonstrate that the Bush Administration has expanded the concept of
national security beyond the traditional Exon-Florio focus on traditional
military activity.215
214 Harry L. Clark & Sanchitha Jayaram, Intensified International Trade and
Security Policies Can Present Challenges for Corporate Transactions, 38 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 391, 395 (2005) ("The Exon-Florio Amendment has received considerably more
attention in recent years, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 2001 .... );
Implementation of the Exon-Florio Amendment and the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States: Hearing Before the S. Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs Comm., 109th Cong. (2005), available at LEXIS Federal News Service Database
[hereinafter Implementation Hearings] (David Marchick, Partner at Covington and
Burling and CFIUS expert, testified before the Senate Committee that the Bush
Administration had applied "greater scrutiny" to CFIUS transactions since the attacks of
September 11, 2001 by "impos[ing] tougher [security] requirements as a condition for
approval, ... and enhanc[ing] enforcement of security agreements negotiated through the
Exon-Florio process."); David Marchick, Mark Plotkin & David Fagan, National Security
Regulation of Foreign Investments and Acquisitions in the United States, CHINA L. &
PRAC., June 2005, at 23, 24-25.
215 Clark & Jayaram, supra note 214, at 395 ("In a series of Exon-Florio cases, the
Bush Administration has made it clear that it intends to scrutinize inbound investment
more closely and that it has adopted a broader view of the types of transactions that could
threaten national security."). Clark and Jayaram go on to discuss a number of recent
transactions which received greater scrutiny by CF1US than would have been expected
before September 11. For example, the attempted acquisition of Global Crossing by
China's Hutchison Whampoa ultimately failed due to strong CFIUS resistance. Id. at
395-96. The Department of Defense raised serious concerns about the acquisition of the
Silicon Valley Group by ASML, a Dutch company, and the matter was sent to the
President for a decision. Id. at 395. Finally, CFIUS intensely scrutinized the acquisition
of IBM by Lenovo, a Chinese company, approving it only after concluding a mitigation
agreement. Id. at 396. The Bush Administration has also increased the use of network
security agreements, a form of mitigation agreement with telecommunications companies
that allows the Department of Justice to gain access to their facilities in order to carry out
wiretaps and electronic surveillance. Id. at 396. Clark and Jayaram's argument seems to
receive further support from the fact that it was the likelihood of a negative report by
CFrUS after a forty-five-day investigation, and subsequent likely negative determination
by the President that led an Israeli company to give up its bid to acquire a U.S. internet
security company. See, e.g., Jamie Smith Hopkins, Siobhan Gorman & Tricia Bishop,
Security Fears Scuttle Deals; Sourcefire Episode Reflects Shift Against Foreign-Owner
Roles, BALTIMORE SUN, Mar. 25, 2006, at 12C. The Department of Defense and FBI had
raised serious concerns about foreign ownership of a company that provides internet
security technology to their respective national security related agencies. Dagoni, supra
note 143.
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The Bush Administration's efforts to take a vigilant approach towards
mergers and acquisitions that could potentially negatively impact U.S.
national security under Exon-Florio is appropriate, and in line with the
Administration's broader national security policy goals. However, the need
to focus on threats to national security that could emerge in the context of
foreign mergers and acquisitions must be balanced against another important
consideration: the need to maintain an open investment policy.2 16 This policy
not only benefits the U.S. economy in a direct sense, but also benefits the
United States and world economies indirectly by serving as an example of
the need for other states to reciprocate with open investment policies.217
Therefore, it is important that any changes to the Exon-Florio statute not
inappropriately upset the current balance between national security and an
open investment policy.
A. Analysis of the Current National Security/Open Investment Balance
As presently constituted, the Exon-Florio system strikes a proper balance
between national security and open foreign investment.218 This balance is
possible due to the lack of a definition of national security, the freedom to
negotiate mitigation agreements with foreign firms, the stability inherent in a
system which is relatively free of politicization from outside forces, and the
dynamic interaction and exchange of ideas between the CFIUS member
agencies that ensures all concerns are addressed. In fact, even the GAO,
which offered an extensive criticism of the Treasury Department's leadership
216 The need for maintaining such a balance in the Exon-Florio context has been
recognized by the Bush Administration. See Kimmitt, supra note 212, at 11 ("The
interests of both the US and foreign countries and investors are served by striking the
right balance between open investment and national security."). This necessity was also
recognized by the Administration of President George H. W. Bush. Foreign Direct
Investment Hearings, supra note 100, at 3 (statement of William E. Barreda, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Trade and Investment Policy, Department of the Treasury) ("[W]e
believe the Exon-Florio statute is achieving its goal in striking a very delicate balance,
the balance that protects the national security without discouraging foreign direct
investment.").
217 Editorial, Ports of Gall, WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2006, at A10; Posting of Dale
Oesterle to Business Law Prof Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/businesslaw/2006/02/myeditorialon.html#more
(Feb. 27, 2006) [hereinafter Oesterle, Business Law Prof Blog] ("Economists caution that
international investment goes both ways. For our companies to enjoy the opportunity to
invest abroad, we must allow foreign companies to invest here. Blocking local
investments is a prelude to a trade war in which all the participants lose economic
vitality.").
218 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Todd M. Malan,
President and CEO, Organization for International Investment).
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of CFIUS in its 2005 report, expressed agreement with the first two of these
points (at a minimum) during testimony before the Senate Banking
Committee.219 While the Exon-Florio statute itself does not necessarily detail
the importance of these four factors, and though they were not necessarily
foreseen by the drafters of the statute, they do reflect the compromises that
were struck in 1988 when the statute was first passed. 220 Over time, these
factors have demonstrated to be the strength of the Exon-Florio system.
The lack of a firm definition of national security in the Exon-Florio
context ensures that CFIUS can respond to novel or emerging threats to
national security while preventing the Committee from expanding its
influence into areas which are not properly the subject of CFJUS review.221
CFIUS cases which have received press attention demonstrate the benefit of
the lack of a definition of national security. For example, in 2004, CFIUS
reviewed the proposed acquisition of Global Crossing, an American provider
of fiber-optic networks, by Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. of Hong Kong,
China.222 After a forty-five-day investigation was initiated, Hutchison
Whampoa ultimately dropped out of the transaction. The Department of
Defense raised national security concerns related to the ownership of the
company by the Chinese government in part because of the possibility of that
government gaining access to U.S. communications. 223 The technology
maintained by Global Crossing clearly does not fit within the traditional
conception of national security inputs; it is not technology directly used by
the military, such as a tank or missile. However, it is technology which is
essential to the operation of a high-tech military in the twenty-first century,
219 Foreign Investment Hearings, supra note 195 (testimony of Katherine Schinasi,
Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, Government Accountability
Office, and Ann Calvaresi-Barr, Director, Industrial Base Issues, Government
Accountability Office).
220 For a discussion of the compromise that was struck by the Reagan
Administration and the original drafters of the Exon-Florio statute, see supra text
accompanying notes 71-85.
221 The Treasury Department seems to agree with this assessment today. Stephanie
Kirchgaessner, Treasury Official Defends Foreign Takeover Vetting, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 21, 2005, at 10 (quoting Deputy Secretary Robert Kimmitt) ("The day
you try to define [national security] it will be out of date."). This position, however, has
its critics. Some in the business world argue that the lack of a definition creates
uncertainty, and criticize the fact that the approach to national security depends on the
particular views of the presidential administration in place at any particular time. See,
e.g., Fenton, supra note 213, at 213 n.96; Oesterle, Business Law Prof. Blog, supra note
217.
222 Jonathan Peterson, Panel Has a Big Say in Foreign Purchases; Security
Clearance for a Chinese Bid for Unocal Would Hinge on Obscure US. Committee, L.A.
TIMES, July 5, 2005, at C4.
223 Id.
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thus leading to the concerns of the Defense Department about the secrecy of
government communications. 224 Similarly, in 2005, some argued that the
safety of the nation's oil supply was a matter of national security that should
justify CFIUS's heightened scrutiny of CNOOC's attempt to acquire
Unocal. 225 Concerns about oil, like concerns about telecommunications, also
do not fit within the traditional concept of military inputs; and the lack of a
definition of national security allowed this non-traditional but still security-
related concern to be addressed.
Thus, while debate exists on this point, there are strong arguments to be
made for the inclusion of the telecommunications and oil industries within
the national security rubric. By leaving "national security" undefined both in
the Exon-Florio statute itself and in the Treasury-issued CFIUS regulations,
the Committee is able to adapt the concept of national security to situations
which may not be directly covered by a list of factors provided by Congress
in the 1988 statute. The Bush Administration takes this concept a step
further, and seems to argue that economic security is in fact already a
component of national security.226 Therefore, even if one did not accept the
224 See id. It should also be noted here that after Hutchison Whampoa withdrew its
bid to acquire Global Crossing, Singapore Technologies Telemedia received approval
from President Bush to acquire the U.S. company. Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note
138 (testimony of Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Treasury).
This approval came after a full forty-five-day investigation by CFIUS. Id. A report on the
President's approval of the transaction was sent to Congress, the most recent such report
to be completed. Id.
225 See supra text accompanying notes 161-63; Steve Lohr, Unocal Bid Denounced
at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2005, at C1. Arguments linking oil to national security
were made at a Congressional hearing by former CIA Director R. James Woolsey and
other witnesses. Id. Their argument was that China's growing economy and military were
driving it to build up oil assets, and thus allowing CNOOC to purchase Unocal would
fuel the country's military growth and disadvantage the United States. Id. Others,
including the libertarian Cato Institute, argued that the actual threat from CNOOC's
acquisition of Unocal was non-existent, due to the nature of oil as a fungible global
commodity. Id.
226 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 17 ("A strong world economy
enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the
world."); Implementation Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury Robert M. Kimmitt) ("[T]he concept of national security includes both
traditional foreign policy and defense criteria and also economic considerations. Indeed,
we believe there is an inherent link between our national security interests and a strong
U.S. economy that facilitates free and fair trade ... and the free flow of capital across
borders."). It should be noted that considering economic security one component among
many of national security is a far cry from making economic security a goal of CFIUS
review, as has been proposed by some and is discussed below. See infra text
accompanying notes 290-302. This more limited approach to including economic
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argument that CNOOC's acquisition of Unocal's oil reserves would have
posed a threat to national security as traditionally understood, the acquisition
could certainly have been viewed as a threat to the economic element of
national security, and thus addressed by Exon-Florio.
The risk of this lack of a definition of national security, of course, is that
this gap could be exploited by a future protectionist-minded presidential
administration to block transactions which properly should not be deemed to
be national security threats. 227 For example, a view of national security
which includes a protectionist-minded approach to economic security might
lead to CFUS involvement in efforts to protect the ailing American
automobile industry, a result clearly not intended by the Exon-Florio statute.
Regardless of whether this approach would even be feasible (pressure to
avoid this protectionist approach would surely come from parts of the
business community and free-traders in Congress), this risk has not played
itself out in fact to date, and does not seem to justify giving up the benefits of
leaving national security undefined.
Second, the current Exon-Florio system is very conducive to the
negotiation of mitigation agreements. These agreements, negotiated by
concerned CFIUS member agencies with the acquiring foreign company, are
meant to permit CFIUS to address national security concerns while neither
creating a perception of unfriendliness to foreign investment nor actually
limiting foreign investment in any significant manner.228 Such agreements
may allow for future monitoring of the company's activities by government
officials, require the appointment of special security officers, require
government access to the company's business records, etc. 229 With the threat
of a forty-five-day investigation, which carries a negative connotation, or
even of a negative recommendation to the President and subsequent
presidential determination to prevent or undo a transaction, foreign
security as one factor among many in a national security analysis seems more appropriate
than adding it as a new and separate criteria for review.
227 The Wall Street Journal criticized certain opponents of the Dubai Ports World
deal, including New York Senator Hillary Clinton, for using national security as an
excuse to promote protectionist goals. Ports of Gall, supra note 217, at A10 ("The new
protectionists use national security as their cover.").
228 Fenton, supra note 213, at 213.
2 2 9 See, e.g., Biridis, supra note 174; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 192, at 18-20. The GAO found that the Department of Homeland Security has
become the lead CFIUS member agency on the enforcement of these mitigation
agreements, and has developed formal procedures for monitoring compliance. Id. The
Department of Defense's representative at the 2005 hearings regarding CFIUS was one of
several agency representatives to state that the negotiation of mitigation agreements was
an important tool in the CFIUS process. Implementation Hearings, supra note 214
(prepared statement of Peter Flory, Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy,
United States Department of Defense).
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companies involved in CFIUS transactions have a strong incentive to reach
agreements which will mitigate national security concerns in the eyes of
CFRUS member agencies. 230
Whether these mitigation agreements are reached with the Committee as
a whole or with an individual member of the Committee, they have the effect
of permitting the foreign investment to go ahead while addressing national
security concerns. In fact, the ability for individual CFIUS member agencies
to work out their own mitigation agreements with foreign companies is a
strength of the system; because CFIUS prefers to make decisions by
consensus, members of the Committee that express concerns with a given
transaction can prevent approval by withholding their vote until a satisfactory
mitigation agreement is reached.231 Therefore, CFIUS exploits this incentive
to reach pinpoint agreements, an arrangement which protects national
security without having to use the blunt force of a negative presidential
decision. Were negative presidential decisions necessary in every case in
which minor national security concerns arose, CFIUS would indeed be a
serious problem for the country's open investment policy.232 As currently
constituted, however, the use of mitigation agreements contributes to the
balance that is currently maintained under Exon-Florio between national
security and the needs of an open investment policy.
Third, CFIUS at present operates in an environment that is usually
isolated from political concerns, thus preserving the balance between
national security and an open investment policy. 233 This is not to say that
CFRUS is not a politicized group--certainly a group of six cabinet secretaries
and six high-level White House aides is as political as a group can be.
However, the fact that CFIUS usually operates in relative obscurity and is
230 A 2002 analysis of the Exon-Florio process found that CFRJS only initiated
forty-five-day investigations during the period that GAO reviewed when it was unable to
negotiate a mitigation agreement with the acquiring company during the thirty-day
review. U.S GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, DEFENSE TRADE: MITIGATING NATIONAL
SECURITY CONCERNS UNDER ExON-FLORIO COULD BE IMPROVED 6 (2002).
231 Reports indicate that the Department of Homeland Security did just this in regard
to the Dubai Ports World acquisition of P&O. See Biridis, supra note 174.
232 The GAO, however, has criticized CFIUS's member agencies for being too lax
in their implementation of these mitigation agreements. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, supra note 192, at 2-3. Specifically, GAO found in 2002 that mitigation
agreements often contained "nonspecific language that may make them difficult to
implement." Id. at 2. Additionally, GAO found that often these agreements did not have
sufficient oversight from CFIUS member agencies or conditions on compliance. Id at 3.
233 See Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Todd M. Malan,
President and CEO of the Organization for International Investment) (discussing
administrative decision-making on a case-by-case basis free of congressional
involvement).
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normally free from congressional interference234 ensures that the process
cannot be easily co-opted by members of Congress whose districts might be
especially impacted by a certain merger or acquisition. 235
For example, though Senator Evan Bayh of Indiana opposed the
acquisition of Indiana-based Magnequench by a Chinese company, the
transaction was still completed.2 36 The CNOOC and DPW examples
discussed at length in this Note demonstrate, however, that Congress can and
does involve itself in the CFIUS process when especially significant
transactions occur and widespread opposition exists. While congressional
oversight on certain transactions may be beneficial, it is appropriate that this
involvement is the exception rather than the rule. A lack of politicization in
the process of approving CFIUS transactions should foster stability and
predictability-goals of the business community-while only involving
politics in those transactions which have great potential to harm national
security.2 37 The absence of pervasive congressional involvement in the
review process encourages CFIUS to make objective decisions about
234 The statute specifically does not include Congress in the Exon-Florio process
until after the President has made a determination on whether to allow a transaction or to
block it; Congress is only notified of the details of a specific transaction if the review,
investigation, and presidential determination are all completed. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g)
(2000).
235 As was demonstrated by the legislative history discussed earlier in this Note, the
compromise reached between Exon-Florio's Democratic sponsors and the Reagan
Administration sought to avoid a politicized process. Exon-Florio "was designed by the
Reagan Administration to be discreet, and to keep Congress out, precisely to avoid such
politicization." Editorial, The New Protectionists: How to Create a Real Security Crisis,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2006, at A18.
236 See Evelyn Iritani, New Foreign Investment Scrutiny Pushed; The Drive Was
Mounted After China's Push for Unocal, but Businesses Fear That it Could Keep Out
Much-Needed Capital From Overseas, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at 3. The statement
above is not meant to pass judgment on the Magnequench deal, but rather to illustrate the
fact that congressional pressure usually must be significant to overcome a CFIUS
determination that allows a deal to proceed.
237 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of David Marchick,
Partner, Covington and Burling). Marchick stated:
[Including Congress in the CFIUS process] would create so much uncertainty about
the prospect of Congressional involvement in the review process that a substantial
number of foreign investors would simply not make investments in the United
States.... But Congress should not itself become a regulatory agency. Congress has
not, and would not, override Hart-Scott-Rodino decisions made by the Department
of Justice or the FTC.
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transactions, thus allowing it to protect national security while acting
consistently with an open foreign investment policy.238
Finally, the current membership structure of CFRUS and its preference to
operate by consensus ensure that both national security and an open
investment policy are protected, while not short-changing either goal. For
example, the GAO's 2005 analysis found that the Department of Defense
often holds a broader conception of national security than does the Treasury
Department.239 Because of its unique role in the national security arena, the
Department of Defense seems to be given a great degree of deference by
other members of CFRUS. 240 Meanwhile, the Treasury Department, in its role
as chair of the Committee, serves as a reminder to the outside world-and
238 The author would argue that CFIUS's approval of the DPW transaction prior to
the involvement of Congress is an example of how a depoliticized decision-making
environment allows CFIUS to make objective decisions. Though the DPW deal came
under intense criticism from both sides of the aisle, objective analysis of the transaction
seems to indicate that any national security concerns were appropriately dealt with by the
Bush Administration. If the deal had been completed, DPW would have merely gained
operational control at a limited number of terminals within a limited number of ports.
Sanger & Lipton, supra note 5, at A12. DPW and Dubai have cooperated with the
Container Security Initiative, and the UAE has demonstrated that it is a strong ally of the
United States in the War on Terror. Concerns that Islamic terrorists could have used the
UAE's ultimate ownership of DPW as a means of gaining access to U.S. ports seem born
more of fear than fact; the same could be said for Islamic terrorists based in Britain,
which is home to P&O, yet that does not mean that P&O should have been excluded from
managing these same U.S. port terminals under British ownership. Additionally, neither
the author nor most commentators criticizing the deal have access to the classified
intelligence that the Administration holds, and so a full accurate analysis is not possible.
To believe that this intelligence objectively demonstrated a significant national security
threat from the DPW deal, however, would require believing "that President Bush has
suddenly gone soft on security," a conclusion that would defy everything we know about
this President. Ports of Gall, supra note 217, at AlO.
Thus, CFIUS was probably correct in approving the DPW acquisition of P&O. It
was only after partisan politics was introduced to the review by Congress's insertion of
itself into the matter that objective analysis of the situation went by the wayside.
Numerous members of Congress and commentators talked about the Administration's
"decision to sell our ports," an assertion that was simply untrue. See, e.g., Press Release,
Senator Harry Reid, Reid: It Takes More Than Tough Talk to Protect the Nation (Feb. 24,
2006), http://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/record.cfm?id=251908&. However,
the author also believes that not all future administrations will necessarily approach
CFIUS decisions responsibly, and thus congressional awareness and oversight of the
CFIUS process is important. See infra text accompanying notes 274-89.
239 U.S. GoV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 12.
240 Lewis, supra note 161, at 465. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has also
traditionally wielded significant influence in the CFIUS process. The DOJ and
Department of Defense (DOD) together have historically taken the lead role in
negotiating mitigation agreements before any final CFIUS vote is taken. Id.
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presumably to CFIUS members-that open investment is an important goal
that should be sustained unless there are serious national security problems
with a transaction. 241 The end result of these disagreements over policy, or at
least over the weight of certain facts in various transactions, is a system in
which CFIUS members typically act by consensus to ensure that all concerns
are met.242 However, if even one member feels that a national security
concern exists and consensus cannot be achieved, the Committee moves into
a forty-five-day investigation in order to get more information and to address
the concerns of all parties. 243 Therefore, the process as currently structured
ensures that all views are addressed and that no transaction proceeds over the
objection of any member agency.
B. Analysis of Proposed Changes to the Exon-Florio Balance
Given the fact that the current implementation of Exon-Florio strikes the
proper balance between forceful protection of national security and a firm
commitment to foreign investment, it is important that any proposed changes
to the Exon-Florio statute merely enhance this balance, rather than upset it.
Suggestions for amending Exon-Florio made within the past year have been
many and varied. The bills currently moving through Congress sponsored by
Senator Shelby and Representative Blunt seem to have backed away from
some of the more radical suggestions to change Exon-Florio that were
proposed in recent months. However, it is still useful to examine some of the
more significant proposals for change and to evaluate their possible effect on
the balance currently maintained by CFIUS between national security and
open investment. 244 The provisions of recent proposals to amend Exon-Florio
deserving the most focused attention are those proposals that (1) give
Congress the ability to pass a joint resolution reversing the president's
241 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of David Marchick,
Partner, Covington & Burling).
242 See Implementation Hearings, supra note 214; see also Lewis, supra note 161.
243 Implementation Hearings, supra note 214.
244 Clearly, legislation proposed in one session of Congress to deal with a particular
issue may differ in substantial ways from legislation introduced in another session on the
same issue. Therefore, the following analysis is not meant to describe the effect of
changes that will necessarily be made to Exon-Florio, but rather to demonstrate why
substantial changes to CFIUS have the potential to harm the balance between national
security and open investment, a result that would ultimately undermine both goals. Even
if the bills sponsored by Shelby and Blunt are eventually reconciled and enacted, some of
the more radical proposals for changing CF1US could re-emerge in the future if another
transaction that excited Congress and the public such as the DPW transaction were to
emerge. Therefore, the remainder of this Note avoids commenting on specific proposals
currently before Congress, and rather focuses on the most significant recent proposals.
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decisions under the statute; (2) add economic security as a touchstone for
CFRUS review; (3) enhance CFUS's reporting requirements to Congress;
and (4) shift the chairmanship of CFIUS from the Secretary of the Treasury
to the Secretary of Defense or Homeland Security.
1. Congressional Review of CFIUS Decisions
In 2005, Senator Inhofe proposed amending the Exon-Florio statute in
order to give Congress the ability to review and overrule CFTUS decisions
that would permit a merger or acquisition to proceed.245 Specifically, the bill
stated that after a decision by the President to permit an acquisition, Congress
would have ten days to introduce a joint resolution that would have the effect
of blocking the acquisition.246 If a joint resolution was introduced, the
acquisition could not commence until thirty days had passed since the
introduction of that resolution. 247 If the resolution was passed by both houses
245 Inhofe's amendment would have added section (1) to Exon-Florio:
(1) Congressional Authority.
(1) In general. If the President does not suspend or prohibit an acquisition, merger,
or takeover under subsection (d), the acquisition, merger, or takeover may not be
consummated until 10 legislative days after the President notifies the Congress of
the decision not to suspend or prohibit. If a joint resolution objecting to the proposed
transaction is introduced in either House of Congress by the chairman of one of the
appropriate congressional committees during such 10-legislative-day period, the
transaction may not be consummated until 30 legislative days after the date on
which such resolution is introduced.
(2) Disapproval upon passage of resolution. If a joint resolution introduced under
paragraph (1) is enacted into law, the transaction may not be consummated.
(3) Considerations. The Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the
Senate and the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives
shall review any findings and recommendations submitted under subsection (a) or
(b), and any joint resolution under paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be based on
the factors outlined in subsection (f).
(4) Senate procedure. Any joint resolution under paragraph (1) shall be considered
in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b) of the International
Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-329, 90
Stat. 765).
(5) House consideration. For the purpose of expediting the consideration and
enactment of a joint resolution under paragraph (1), a motion to proceed to the
consideration of any such joint resolution shall be treated as highly privileged in the
House of Representatives.
Foreign Investment Security Act of 2005, S. 1797, 109th Cong. § 2(5) (2005).
246 Id.
247 Id.
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and signed by the President, then the transaction would be completely
blocked.248 At least in Inhofe's 2005 proposal, it should be mentioned, no
reference is made to any congressional power to overrule the President on a
decision not to order divestiture of an already acquired company though this
may have been a mere drafting oversight. 249
While the furor over the Dubai ports deal in 2006 stemmed in part from
the fact that Congress was not notified by CFIUS of its intent to approve the
acquisition of P&O by DPW, and thus changes may indeed be appropriate to
Exon-Florio in the area of CFIUS's obligations to comply with congressional
oversight,250 the Inhofe bill's mechanism for inserting Congress in CFIUS's
activities is unwise. At least one individual opposed to increased
congressional involvement in CFIUS has argued that such a change as that in
Senator Inhofe's proposal might be unconstitutional under INS v. Chadha.251
This charge merits careful analysis, but ultimately fails as a matter of
constitutional law.
In Chadha, the United States Supreme Court examined section 244(c)(2)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which gave the Attorney General the
ability to permit certain aliens to remain in the country. 252 Section 244(c)(2)
of this Act permitted one house of Congress to overrule decisions by the
Attorney General to permit an individual to remain in the United States
rather than face deportation.253 Chadha, an East Indian who held a British
passport and was born in Kenya, was permitted to remain in the United
States by the Attorney General, acting through an immigration judge.254 In
December 1975, the House of Representatives passed a resolution overruling
this decision and requiring Chadha's deportation. 255
The Court rested its opinion on two grounds: bicameralism and
presentment.256 The Supreme Court held that the Constitution specifically
248 Id. This is assuming that the language of the statute should be taken at its face
value, and by "joint resolution" the involvement of the President is intended. See infra
note 263.
249 Id. Such a resolution would be necessary, for example, in a situation such as the
one in 1990 where the CATIC/MAMCO transaction was consummated before the
President could render his final decision. See supra notes 140-43.
250 See infra text accompanying notes 274-89.
251 See Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983);
Implementation Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of David Marchick, Partner,
Covington and Burling) ("I think it also ... creates some separation of powers issues and
may have problems under the Chadha decision.").
252 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 923.
253 See id at 923.
254 See id. at 923-24.
255 Id. at 927-28.
256 Id. at 945.
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requires that all actions of a legislative character be approved by both houses
of Congress and then be presented to the President for his signature.
257
Because one chamber's effort to overrule the Attorney General's decision to
permit Chadha to remain in the country was legislative in character, and
made by one house acting alone without the President's involvement, the
actions of the House of Representatives in regards to Chadha violated the
bicameralism and presentment requirements. 258 Furthermore, as one of the
dissenters pointed out, the Court wrote its opinion in such a broad manner
that it not only invalidated the one-house legislative veto provision
specifically before it, but it declared all legislative vetoes of any type to be
unconstitutional. 259
Therefore, if the congressional role in CFIJS decisions envisioned by
the Foreign Investment Security Improvement Act were a legislative veto, it
would be unconstitutional. In fact, this proposal is not a legislative veto.
Rather, it can be better characterized as a "report-and-wait" provision that is
constitutional under Sibbach v. Wilson.260 In that case, the Supreme Court
held constitutional a statute that prevented newly-promulgated Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure from going into effect until they had been reported to the
Congress and a certain amount of time had passed. 261 The Supreme Court
stated that without the one-house veto § 244(c)(2) would have been similar to
the statutory provision found Constitutional in Sibbach.262 The Inhofe
proposal is analogous to the Sibbach statute, rather than to the Chadha
statute, because a joint resolution passed by both houses of Congress requires
the signature of the President in order to have the force of law.263 Therefore
2 5 7 Id. at 952.
258 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 959.
259 Id. at 959-60 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 967 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("Today the Court not only invalidates § 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, but also sounds the death knell for nearly 200 other statutory provisions
in which Congress has reserved a 'legislative veto.').
260 Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941).
261 Id. at 15-16; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 935 n.9 ("[The Sibbach statute] did not
provide that Congress could unilaterally veto the Federal Rules. Rather, it gave Congress
the opportunity to review the Rules before they became effective and to pass legislation
barring their effectiveness if the Rules were found objectionable.") (emphasis in
original).
262 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 935, n.8-9.
263 A joint resolution "requires the approval of both chambers and, with [the
exception of constitutional amendments], is submitted (just as a bill) to the President for
possible signature into law." United States Senate Glossary,
http://www.senate.gov/reference/glossary..term/jointresolution.htm; accord BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1178 (8th ed. 1999). However, it should be noted that while the
language of the statute---"joint resolution"-would by definition include presentment to
the President for signature, there is a slight possibility that this is not the intent of the
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there is probably no bicameralism or presentment problem for Senator
Inhofe's proposal, which functions as a "report-and-wait" provision rather
than a legislative veto prohibited by Chadha.
The Supreme Court recognized that the powers of the President in the
field of national security are extremely strong in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.2 6 4 The Court in that case explained that "the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. '265 In
order to allow the President to fully carry out this constitutional duty:
[I]f, in the maintenance of our international relations, embarrassment-
perhaps serious embarrassment-is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made effective through
negotiation and inquiry within the international field must often accord to
the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction
which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.
Moreover, he, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in
time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He [also] has
his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials. 266
These statements were made in the context of an evaluation by the Court
of a statute that allowed the President to forbid the sale of arms to certain
countries if he found doing so was necessary to ensure peace.267 Such a
statute, which recognizes the complete authority of the President to make a
decision in a field of national security, seems analogous at a minimum to the
current Exon-Florio statute. Additionally, Justice Jackson's concurring
opinion in the "Steel Seizure Case"--which has come to be the defining
opinion on such separation of powers issues-stated that in the field of
national security, especially when authorized by an act of Congress, the
President's power was "at its maximum. '268 While Curtiss-Wright Export
Co. and Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown do not
definitively mean that Inhofe's proposal is unconstitutional, they do raise
drafters, because no mention of the President is made in the bill's description of this
process. If Senator Inhofe's bill is meant to exclude the President, and merely to allow
Congress on its own initiative to block a transaction, then there would clearly be a
problem under Chadha, and the involvement of Congress in such a manner would be
clearly unconstitutional.
264 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936);
accord THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
265 Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 319.
266 Id. at 320.
267 Id. at 311-13.
268 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-36 n.2 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
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serious separation of powers concerns regarding Congress's proposed
involvement in the CFIUS process, and at a minimum give strong persuasive
weight to policy arguments against such involvement.
If the concept of giving Congress oversight authority over the President's
CFJUS decision is completely acceptable from a constitutional standpoint,
such a system would prove highly disruptive to the current balance between
national security and open investment maintained by the Exon-Florio
statute. 269 Already many corporations view CFIUS as a tool that can be used
as another anti-takeover device in the corporate arsenal; lobbying the
Department of Defense to oppose CFIUS approval of a transaction has even
been termed a "Pentagon ploy" and is presented as an anti-takeover defense
in a leading mergers and acquisitions casebook for law students.270 Were
corporations and local officeholders in areas where those corporations are
located able to lobby members of Congress in order to seek their support in
an effort to block a takeover by foreign persons, CFRUS would succumb even
further to protectionist pressures.27' It has already been seen that even
without an express statutory role in the Exon-Florio process, members of
Congress often insert themselves in that process in order to address various
concerns ranging from protecting hometown companies to advancing
national security.272 If their role were expanded to include the ability to
269 See, e.g., Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of David
Marchick, Partner, Covington and Burling).
270 DALE OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUIsITIONS 917-20 (3d ed.
2005). There is no need to review the legality of CFIUS as a takeover defense under
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) or Revlon v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
271 Ports of Gall, supra note 217, at A10 ("[CF1US] is an executive branch function
precisely to avoid the parochial concerns that dominate Congress. If Congress ran
CF1US, every Member would have a chance to interfere with every private foreign
investment."). In fact, in the time since the DPW controversy, some businesses
contemplating CFIUS-qualifying mergers have hired lobbyists to promote the deal in
Congress in order to avoid a similar negative reaction. See, e.g., Judy Sarasohn, Alcatel
and Lucent Lobbyists Are on the Job, WASH. POST, May 11, 2006, at A25 (describing the
hiring of former Bush Administration associate counsel Reginald Brown and former
Clinton Administration Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick, along with other high-
profiled lobbyists, to avoid a repeat of the DPW controversy over the merger of the
French company Alcatel with the U.S. company Lucent Technologies).
272 See supra notes 161-68 for a discussion of Congress's role in the CNOOC affair;
supra notes 177-90 for Congress's role in the DPW transaction; Iritani, supra note 236,
at 3, for a representative effort by an individual member, Senator Bayh, to influence a
home-state transaction. Recently, Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) illustrated the
perils of turning CFIUS into a tool by which lawmakers can push their own causes when
she called on CFIUS to investigate the acquisition of a "U.S. supplier of voting
equipment by a Boca Raton company that once had controversial connections to the
Venezuelan government." Pablo Bachelet, Voting Machine Sale in Question, MIAMI
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overrule a presidential decision based on a joint resolution, the focus on the
Exon-Florio process would shift towards being a protectionist tool, rather
than an effective and disciplined means of protecting national security.273
Such a system would inject great instability into the mergers and acquisitions
business environment without any significant contribution to national
security. Instability of this nature could potentially lead to fewer merger and
acquisition attempts, a result that would ultimately have a negative impact on
the U.S. economy and economic growth.
2. Enhanced Reporting Requirements
Nearly every proposal to amend Exon-Florio, both in the past and in the
aftermath of the CNOOC and DPW deals, has included a provision requiring
enhanced reporting by CFIUS to Congress on its review and investigation
activities. For example, after the Thomson/LTV transaction controversy,
Congress passed an amendment to Exon-Florio proposed by Senator Byrd.2 74
The Byrd Amendment was not limited to the mandatory investigations issue
described earlier in this Note; it also strengthened the requirement that when
a President makes a decision on a transaction he must transmit a report to
Congress detailing the reasons for his decision. 275 Because presidential
decisions on CFIUS transactions are rare, these reports are almost never
HERALD, May 9, 2006, at 13A. While the author applauds Representative Maloney's
willingness to criticize Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, considering his vitriolic anti-American
stance and willingness to harm the interests of Venezuelan citizens, a call for CFIUS to
investigate such an extremely thin link to a foreign government seems based more on
political opportunism than any real national security concern.
273 Ports of Gall, supra note 217, at A10; see also The New Protectionists: How to
Create a Real Security Crisis, supra note 235, at A18 ("If you think corruption on
Capitol Hill is bad now, wait until [foreign companies] need approval from Congress for
every multi-billion-dollar investment."). Of course, the reverse argument made by the
members of Congress who support such a change to Exon-Florio is that by involving
Congress in the Exon-Florio process, national security will be strengthened because
Congress will serve as a check on an open investment policy approach that ignores
national security. While not without merit, this argument ignores the fact that the
Department of Defense, not to mention the Department of Homeland Security and other
security-focused agencies and White House officials, already hold great influence in the
CFIUS process and are the entities best equipped to assess national security threats and to
communicate their concerns to the President. It appears, then, that the argument that
involving Congress will enhance national security is mostly, though not completely, a
smokescreen for advancing protectionism and enhancing the power of individual
lawmakers.
274 See supra notes 117-20.
275 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(g) (2000).
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made.276 Another amendment added a requirement that CFIUS and the
President provide Congress with a quadrennial report evaluating whether
foreign countries have concerted strategies to acquire U.S. companies in a
certain area and addressing the scope of industrial espionage activities in the
country.277 Only one of the statutorily-required quadrennial reports has ever
been provided to Congress, in 1994.278
In the aftermath of the CNOOC and DPW transactions, numerous
members of Congress again expressed concern that CFIUS does not provide
sufficient information to Congress regarding its reviews of mergers and
acquisitions,279 and several proposals to correct this lack of adequate
information-sharing with Congress were suggested.280
Critics of CFIUS often argue that the Committee is too secretive.
Secrecy, however, is mandated by the Exon-Florio statute; CFIUS is
forbidden from sharing information contained in CFIUS filings with the
276 President George H. W. Bush issued one of these reports, though under the pre-
Byrd Amendment requirements, after ordering the divestiture of MAMCO by CATIC.
Message to the Congress on the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation Divestiture of MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc., President George H. W. Bush,
Feb. 1, 1990, available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid = 18109.
277 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(k).
2 7 8 See generally NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, REPORT ON U.S. CRITICAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF AND
ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES AGAINST U.S. CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES (1994).
279 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. E233, 235 (2006) (statement of Representative Peter
T. King, R-NY) ("The lack of notification [until after a forty-five-day investigation and
Presidential decision are complete] has led to the situation where the concerns of senior
Administration officials, Members of Congress and the general public cannot be
expressed until after a deal is done. This lack of transparency must change.").
280 For example, Senator Inhofe's proposal would have extended 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2170(g) to include a requirement that CFIUS provide quarterly reports to the House and
Senate committees with jurisdiction over CFIUS:
(2) Quarterly submissions. The Secretary of the Treasury shall transmit to the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives on a quarterly
basis, a detailed summary and analysis of each merger, acquisition, or takeover that
is being reviewed, was reviewed during the preceding 90-day period, or is likely to
be reviewed in the coming quarter by the President or the President's designee under
subsection (a) or (b). Each such summary and analysis shall be submitted in
unclassified form, with classified annexes as the Secretary determines are required
to protect company proprietary information and other sensitive information. Each
such summary and analysis shall include an appendix detailing dissenting views.
Foreign Investment Security Act of 2005, S. 1797, 109th Cong. § 4(2) (2005). Senator
Inhofe's proposal would also change CF1US reviews from a thirty to sixty-day process
and require a report to Congress after the completion of each review. Id.
2006]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
general public. 28 ' This confidentiality provision, however, is juxtaposed
against a clear requirement that CFIUS share information contained in these
filings with Congress when asked to do so. 282 In order to comply with both
of these seemingly conflicting statutory mandates, CFRUS representatives
generally refuse to answer questions in public hearings but rather reserve
their answers for closed meetings with Members of Congress.283 This
provision is entirely appropriate and reflects the policy judgment made by
Congress in 1988 when it rejected the Bryant Amendment on the grounds
that requiring disclosure of detailed corporate information could serve as a
hindrance to foreign investment.
The same cannot be said of CFRUS's poor track record for giving
Congress regular updates on its reviews and investigations. 284 The results of
this lack of information sharing were evident in the Dubai Ports World
controversy; most members of Congress learned of the acquisition of P&O
by DPW through press reports days before the deal was to close and after
CFIUS had already ruled out the need for a forty-five day investigation.285
Oversight of executive branch actions is clearly a proper role for Congress,
especially when it was Congress that created the Exon-Florio review
authority in the first place. The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury has
acknowledged that improvements should be made in terms of CFIUS's
communication with and reports to Congress. 286 In fact, enhancing the
281 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c).
282 Id.
283 See, e.g., Department of Defense Hearings, supra note 106, at 228 (statement of
Stephen J. Canner, Treasury Office Director for International Investment) ("You will
appreciate, I hope, that there is little I can say in a public forum on a transaction which is
now before [CFIUS] .... ").
284 See, e.g., C. Fred Bergsten, Editorial, Avoiding Another Dubai, WASH. POST,
Feb. 28, 2006, at A15.
285 Of course, not all the blame can be placed on CFIUS, because the acquisition
was in fact not secret. Reports of the DPW transaction first surfaced in November 2005,
and DPW was open about its intentions in press releases. See Press Release, Dubai Ports
World, Recommended Cash Acquisition of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation
Company ("P&O") by Thunder FZE (the "Offeror"), a Wholly Owned Subsidiary of
Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, Dubai ("PCFC") (Nov. 29, 2005),
http://www.dpworld.com/wadmin/imgdb/DP%20World%200ffer%/2Ofor/ 2OP&O%2OPr
ess%20Release.pdf. Therefore, members of Congress who learned of the transaction
early could have voiced their concerns even before the CFRJS review began.
286 The Administration expressed this willingness through comments made by
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Robert Kimmitt:
Lastly, in picking up on your important point regarding Congress's oversight role,
we support the idea of enhancing the transparency of the CFIUS process through
more effective communication with Congress, while recognizing our shared
responsibility to avoid the disclosure of proprietary information.... We're very
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reporting requirements is a more appropriate oversight role for Congress to
take than actually inserting itself into the approval process as described in the
section above. 287 Therefore, the critical question about this proposed change
to Exon-Florio is not whether it should be made, but what form it should take
in order to enhance, rather than upset, the current balance between national
security and foreign investment.
Fortunately, enhancing CFIUS's reporting requirements--or even simply
insisting that the present requirements be carried out-is unlikely to upset the
current Exon-Florio balance. Any reports that must be submitted to Congress
containing detailed information on specific transactions are confidential, and
thus their contents may not be released to the public; the release of such
information would discourage foreign investment in this country.288
Additionally, Congress already has chosen to involve itself in CFIUS matters
from time to time, as demonstrated by its involvement in the Thomson/LTV,
CNOOC, and DPW transactions, among others. While enhanced reporting
requirements have the potential to marginally increase the quantity of this
interference, they could also prevent anger and misunderstanding of
important factual issues as occurred in the DPW case, and thus possibly head
off unwise overreactions to specific transactions. 289 Therefore, it is entirely
appropriate for Congress to make changes to the reporting system. For
open to suggestions on ways to improve the transparency of the process such as
more regular reports to Congress and congressional briefings.
Implementation Hearings, supra note 214.
287 "Congress has a legitimate and important oversight role ensuring that the Exon-
Florio statute is implemented correctly. But Congress should not itself become a
regulatory agency. Congress has not, and would not, override Hart-Scott-Rodino
decisions made by the Department of Justice or the FTC." Dubai Purchase Hearings,
supra note 138 (statement of David Marchick, Partner, Covington and Burling).
288 See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
289 A former Treasury Department official who worked with CFIUS recently wrote:
"[The Exon-Florio] process contains a major flaw: its failure to inform Congress of
pending transactions in a way that would enable lawmakers to express meaningful
objections in an orderly manner." Bergsten, supra note 284, at A15. The current system,
short on information sharing with Congress, leads to a situation where "Congress can
therefore express its concerns only by leaping into individual cases with great fanfare."
Id The benefit of giving Congress at least some sort of report on the results of an
investigation seem to be demonstrated by the fact that when CFIUS and the President
recently gave the green light to the acquisition of Doncasters, a British company that
supplies parts to U.S. military vehicles and aircraft by a Dubai-owned company, there
was very little protest from Congress. E.g., Stephanie Kirchgaessner, White House
Approves Buying of "Sensitive " Defence Group by Dubai, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 29,
2006, at 7. The President had sent a letter and a classified intelligence assessment of the
deal to the leaders of the House and Senate. Letter from the President to the Speaker of
the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate (Apr. 28, 2006),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/04/20060428-4.html.
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example, the proposed change to a quarterly or monthly reports requirement
and notification of the results of a review after its completion-such as those
proposed by Senator Inhofe and Representative Blunt, respectively-may
introduce positive improvement to the Exon-Florio process.
3. Economic Security as an Element of CFIUS Review
Senator Inhofe's proposal would have made the factors currently laid out
in the Exon-Florio statute290 as elements of national security mandatory,
rather than discretionary, and also would have added a new factor: "the long-
term projections of United States requirements for sources of energy and
other critical resources and materials and for economic security. '291 This
proposal could have a tremendous impact on both the actual operation of
CFIUS and on the role of government in the business world in general. As
stated previously, the term "national security," currently undefined, can be
used to cover threats which may not fit within a traditional military definition
and which have ancillary effects on economic security. 292 Thus, it may not
seem that the addition of economic security as a factor that must be
considered in CFIUS's national security review process would present a
significant change to CFIUS's implementation, but in fact this "small"
change would actually transform the entire framework and purpose of the
Committee in a radical manner.293 With a requirement that the Committee
consider threats to economic security as threats to national security, the
system would shift from a process focused on finding true threats to national
security to a protectionist economic tool.294
290 These factors include "the capability and capacity of domestic industry to meet
national defense requirements," and "domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements." 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(f) (2000).
291 Foreign Investment Security Act of 2005, S. 1797, 109th Cong. § 2(3) (2005)
(emphasis added).
292 See Kimmitt, supra note 212.
293 The importance that would be attached to adding economic security as an Exon-
Florio consideration is underscored by the fact that Republicans in Congress in 1988
urged the President to veto the trade bill that contained Exon-Florio if economic security
was not removed, and that Democrats took this threat seriously enough to remove it from
the final version of Exon-Florio. See supra notes 61-62.
294 "[T]here is good reason to believe that an 'economic security' test would simply
become a vehicle for domestic industries seeking to block foreign competition." Dubai
Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of David Marchick, Partner, Covington
and Burling). The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal has speculated that efforts to
block the DPW transaction and to amend the CFIUS statute may demonstrate the "re-
emergence of the 'national security' protectionists." Editorial, The New Protectionists:
How to Create a Real Security Crisis, supra note 235, at A18.
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For example, under the present system, the Department of Defense could
plausibly argue that a threat to the oil supply of the United States would
threaten national security due to the direct role oil has in the operation of
military aircraft, the functioning of bases, the movement of weapons and
soldiers, as well as the operation of the country in such areas as
telecommunications and other high-tech areas that are now considered
essential to our national defense. 295 This approach informally and
appropriately includes economic security considerations. However, if
economic security were considered a factor in its own right, a CFRUS
member agency could argue, for example, that the purchase of an American
automobile company would further undermine the weak American auto
industry and cut jobs, thereby harming the American economy and national
security. It is easy to envision multiple scenarios of this sort where any
company unhappy with a foreign takeover attempt, or any Congressman
unhappy with the effects of a foreign acquisition of a company within his
district, could put pressure on the members of CFIUS to block transactions
that under the current conception of national security could not be
blocked.296
Thus, including economic security as an element of CFIUS review would
fundamentally transform CFIUS from a purely national security-focused
agency to one that concerned itself with all mergers and acquisitions, and
therefore a tool which could undermine the open foreign investment goals
that have been promoted by the United States for decades. 297 By including
economic security as a criterion in the CFIUS review process, Congress
would open the door for "domestic competitor[s], who lose[] out in mergers
and acquisitions competition, [to] use the CFIUS process to lobby to block
the deal and achieve in the legislative process what they couldn't achieve in
the marketplace."2 98 Merely by including economic security within CFIUS's
review criteria, Congress would reduce CFIUS's ability to protect national
295 Since September 11, 2001, and the addition of DHS to CFIUS's membership, the
Committee seems to have expanded its conception of national security to include critical
infrastructure protection. See, e.g., Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement
of David Marchick, Partner, Covington and Burling).
296 The New Protectionists: How to Create a Real Security Crisis, supra note 235, at
A18.
297 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (prepared statement of Todd M.
Malan, President and CEO, Organization for International Investment). Every President
since Ronald Reagan has actively encouraged foreign direct investment into the United
States. "[T]he executive branch historically has been a strong advocate of an open
investment policy. .. ." Tate, supra note 6, at 2026 (in discussion of Exon-Florio)
(footnotes omitted).
298 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Todd M. Malan,
President and CEO, Organization for International Investment).
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security because of the resources and time that would necessarily be diverted
to dealing with economic issues. For example, if economic security were a
guiding consideration, CFIUS could be forced to spend time on protecting
the U.S. dairy industry from foreign takeover, a prospect that sounds
preposterous in the abstract but that is actually quite plausible considering the
lobbying efforts of that industry on Capitol Hill.299 Deciding such matters is
not the appropriate role for a body that was originally tasked to protect
national security; to expand into the economic arena, then, would
shortchange national security concerns while imposing harmful restrictions
on the free market.
These restrictions on foreign investment, in turn, could encourage
foreign countries to impose their own limitations on foreign investments
from abroad, including from the United States.300 The subsequent decrease in
foreign investment from abroad and in foreign opportunities for American
investors overseas would have an overall negative effect on the U.S.
economy, which in turn would negatively affect national security. For
example, in 2005 China was the most popular destination in the world for
foreign investment, a position long held by the United States.301 Were
299 See id.
300 See Implementation Hearings, supra note 214 (testimony of Robert Kimmitt,
Deputy Secretary of the Treasury) (discussing U.S. efforts to open up foreign countries to
foreign investment and the importance of U.S. credibility on this issue to those efforts).
This fear has already begun to play itself out in fact, as some foreign governments and
companies have taken the visceral reaction against the DPW deal and the loud calls in
Congress for changes to Exon-Florio as signs that the United States is less open to
foreign investment today than it was in the past. See, e.g., Brent Shearer, Raising Barriers
to Inbound Deals: Political Intervention Is Feared in Future Cross-Border M&A,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: DEALMAKER'S J., Vol. 41, Issue 5, May 29, 2006, at 22
("M&A experts are scrambling to make sense of the controversy's impact on future
global dealmaking."); Geoff Elliott, US Fears for Alien Investor Security, AUSTRALIAN,
June 5, 2006, at 19 (Australian newspaper refers to an "outbreak of xenophobia towards
foreign investors" in the U.S.); Jean Eaglesham, Free Trade "Is Not a One- Way Street"
Says UK in Attack on US "Hypocrisy," FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 31, 2006, at 9 (British
trade and industry secretary Alan Johnson criticizes United States for undermining free
trade and open investment principles by rejecting DPW deal and planning to broaden
scope of CFIUS, and warned that free trade cannot be a one-way street). The top financial
regulator in South Korea even pointed to Exon-Florio as support for his view that his
country should take steps to protect certain industries from foreign acquisition. Kim
Jung-Min, Seoul Plans Restrictions on Foreign M&As, KOREA HERALD, Apr. 5, 2006.
301 ORGANIZATION FOR INT'L INVESTMENT, THE INSOURCING SURVEY: PERCEPTIONS
OF THE ATrRACTIVENESS OF THE UNITED STATES AS A LOCATION FOR INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT AND JOB CREATION: A CEO-LEVEL SURVEY OF U.S. SUBSIDIARIES OF
FOREIGN COMPANIES 4 (2005), available at
http://www.ofii.org/issues/insourcingsurvey.pdf (stating that almost half of all CEOs
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foreign companies to view the United States as hostile to their investment
efforts, an even greater incentive would exist to direct resources towards
China-a result which would clearly make China an even greater economic
and national security threat to the United States than it already is. An
examination of the negative effects of protectionism on the U.S. economy is
beyond the scope of this Note. Rather, it is sufficient to realize that opening
up CFIUS reviews to considerations of economic security would
fundamentally alter CFIUS's role and upset the current national security and
open investment balance, as well as undermine long-standing U.S.
government efforts to open foreign countries to foreign investment. 30 2
4. Finding a New Agency to Chair CFIUS
Various members of Congress and commentators who have expressed
displeasure with the implementation of Exon-Florio by CFIUS in the past
have often singled out the Department of the Treasury for criticism in regards
to its chairmanship of the Committee.30 3 In their view, Treasury is
institutionally inclined to favor and promote foreign investment-an
assertion that is absolutely true, as the promotion of foreign investment in the
United States is in fact one of the missions of the department. 304 In the view
of these individuals, Treasury is therefore not the appropriate agency to be
heading up a committee concerned with national security, especially when
the goal of that Committee is to critically review and possibly urge the
President to block such investment. 30 5 Some of these critics-as well as the
GAO's 2005 report on CFIUS-have charged the Treasury Department with
exerting pressure on the other member agencies to adopt its allegedly more
narrow view of national security.306 These individuals have generally favored
viewed China as their priority for future investment, while only twenty-seven percent
singled out the United States).
302 The United States is a signatory to a number of international treaties promoting
free trade and open investment. For example, the United States is a member of the World
Trade Organization. World Trade Organization, United States Member Information Page,
http://www.wto.int/english/thewtoe/countriese/usa e.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
Additionally, the United States Trade Representative, a cabinet-level executive branch
position, is tasked with promoting free trade and open investment in countries around the
world; general information about this office can be found at
http://www.ustr.gov/WhoWeAre/Sectionndex.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
303 See, e.g., Frank J. Gaffney, Jr., Editorial, Peril in Port, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 15, 2006,
at 11.
304 Id.
305 E.g., Paul Blustein, Ports Debate Reawakens Foreign-Investment Jitters:
Proposed Takeover Pits Security Against Economic Fears, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2006,
at D1.
306 Id.; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 192, at 11-13.
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moving the chairmanship of CFIUS to the Department of Defense, an agency
with a clear institutional mission in favor of the protection of national
security. 307 More recently, the Department of Homeland Security has been
suggested as a better candidate for the chairmanship of CF1US, or even as a
possible co-chairman with the Treasury Department.30 8 Similarly, one
senator even went so far as to suggest that he would introduce legislation that
would require the Director of National Intelligence ("DNI") to approve all
foreign investment in the United States 3 9-a move that is clearly
protectionist, as it would create a presumption that deals are to be disallowed
unless facts demonstrate a need for a different outcome. (That is to say
nothing of the fact that giving such a huge responsibility to the DNI would
seem to contradict the streamlining-of-the-intelligence-process function that
was supposed to be served by the DNI's creation.)310
These CFIUS critics certainly have the right motivation; it is entirely
correct to argue that CFIUS should be institutionally capable of acting to stop
any transaction that presents a serious national security problem. They are
correct that open foreign investment concerns must yield when national
security is implicated. However, moving the chairmanship of CFIUS to the
Departments of Defense or Homeland Security would provide no meaningful
additional benefit in terms of protecting national security, and would in
operation likely harm the correct default position taken by CFIUS under
Treasury's leadership-that "foreign investment is welcome unless it
threatens national security. ' 311 This presumption is the appropriate one not
only to maintain the current Exon-Florio balance, but also the best means to
implement the legislative compromise that was struck when Exon-Florio was
passed.
307 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of David Marchick,
Partner, Covington and Burling).
308 See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. E233, E235 (2006) (statement of Representative Peter
T. King, (R-NY) suggesting DHS serve as the co-chair of CFIUS).
309 Michael Schroeder & Greg Hitt, Ports in a Storm: Congress May Fine-Tune
Process To Vet Foreign-Investment Deals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at A12 (proposal
of Sen. Evan Bayh).
310 Office of the Director of Nat'l Intelligence, About ODNI,
http://www.dni.gov/aboutODNI/who.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2006).
311 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of David Marchick)
("Under Treasury's leadership, the presumption is - and should remain - that foreign
investment is welcome unless it threatens national security. If CFTUS were chaired by an
agency with a security mission, the presumption would be reversed.").
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As currently constituted, CFIUS fosters dynamic interaction between
members that leads to the best possible results.312 Deputy Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Kimmitt told Congress in 2006:
As an inter-agency group, CFIUS provides a forum for discussion and
yes, debate among members representing 12 different executive
departments and offices....
The give and take among members leads to a comprehensive
examination of transactions from all relevant agencies. There was a natural
competition of differing perspectives on the part of CFIUS members, and
vigorous debates and constructive friction among members helped CFIUS
ultimately determine the best possible outcome for our national security.3 13
While the CF1US regulations accommodate the possibility that the
Committee may split on a given transaction and thus have to provide
majority and dissenting views to the President after a forty-five-day
investigation,314 Treasury has indicated that the Committee generally
"operates by consensus among its members." 315 In other words, if even one
member agency objects to a transaction, the Committee moves into the forty-
five-day investigation phase.316 This consensus feature is part of what makes
the give and take that currently exists between member agencies so
important; an agency which does not approve of a transaction has the power
to single-handedly prevent approval.
Therefore, while the Treasury Department may chair the Committee, it
does not control the decisions of other member agencies. If a security-
focused agency like DOD were to object to a deal, it would be wrong to
assume that those concerns could be overridden by the other agencies or the
Treasury acting alone. Therefore, keeping the chairmanship of CFIUS at the
Department of the Treasury serves as a signal to foreign investors that their
participation in the U.S. economy is welcome, while ensuring that genuine
national security concerns will be dealt with appropriately.317 Shifting the
chairmanship to DOD-or to the DNI or DHS, for that matter--could
effectively upset this balance with little to no added security benefit, because
312 Implementation Hearings, supra note 214 (statement of Robert Kimmitt, Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury).
313 Id.
314 31 C.F.R. § 800.504 (2005).
315 Dubai Purchase Hearings, supra note 138 (statement of Robert Kimmitt, Deputy
Secretary of the Treasury).
316 Id.
317 E.g., id.
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these security-minded agencies already have ample influence and ability to
be heard within CFIUS.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Note has demonstrated, the Exon-Florio statute currently
maintains a balance between strong, vigilant enforcement of national security
needs and the goal of maintaining an open foreign investment policy. While
numerous critics, including many powerful and sensible members of
Congress, have claimed that CFIUS's implementation of Exon-Florio and the
Department of the Treasury's leadership of that Committee are lax, the facts
point to a different conclusion. Many of the details of how CFIUS operates in
fact are not reflected in the details of the statute. For example, while many
critics point to the fact that only one presidential decision to order divestiture
of an American company has ever been made under Exon-Florio, those
familiar with the process have testified that the mere possibility of Exon-
Florio review has dissuaded far more transactions that would have presented
serious national security challenges from proceeding. Additionally, CFIUS
member agencies have in recent years improved their negotiation and
monitoring of mitigation agreements that allow transactions to proceed while
addressing national security concerns. In other words, the system as it
currently exists is able to provide adequate national security protections
while refraining from becoming a protectionist tool.
Many of the proposals to amend Exon-Florio that are currently receiving
attention are unwise because they would upset this balance. While enhanced
reporting by CFIUS to Congress is a good idea-and might help avoid
problems like those associated with the Dubai Ports World deal-other
proposals, while well-intentioned, go too far towards promoting
protectionism while not providing any additional significant benefit to
national security. If economic security becomes a facet of CFRUS review, if
Congress inserts itself into the CFIUS process by virtue of a "report and
wait" provision, or if the chairmanship of CFIUS is moved from Treasury to
another cabinet department, we can expect significant changes in how CFIUS
conducts business. These changes, however, will not be limited to the
positive ones sought by many in Congress today, but instead could result in
serious negative economic consequences as other foreign persons decrease
their foreign investments in the United States or even change their own
investment laws. Such a result certainly would not effectively serve our
nation's national security needs.
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